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ABSTRACT
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF LOWERING DISCLOSURE THRESHOLDS:
PROPOSED CHANGES TO SFAS NO. 5
FEBRUARY 2011
KIRSTEN FANNING, B.S.B.A., DREXEL UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Christopher P. Agoglia
Recently, investors have asserted that firms‟ loss contingency disclosures are not
adequate to allow them to assess the likelihood of material losses due to litigation (i.e.,
litigation risk), and a debate has developed over whether the threshold for disclosure
should be lowered to provide investors with more information relating to litigation.
Using an experiment, I investigate two unintended consequences of lowering a disclosure
threshold, as the FASB has recently proposed. First, I find that adding low probability
lawsuits to the disclosure of reasonably possible lawsuits lowers prospective investors‟
perceptions of litigation risk relating to the disclosure, even though more lawsuits are
disclosed. Second, lowering the threshold allows firms to portray the entire disclosure
opportunistically, diverting attention from higher probability to lower probability
lawsuits. I find evidence that firms can use such an opportunistic presentation under a
lower threshold to their advantage. Specifically, prospective investors‟ and even short
investors‟ perceptions were just as favorable to the firm as long investors‟ when the
disclosure threshold was lower and firms adopted an opportunistic disclosure strategy.
Thus, my findings suggest that the FASB‟s proposal to require disclosure of lower

vii

probability loss contingencies may have unintended consequences for investors‟
perceptions of firms‟ loss exposure.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS…………………………………………………………….… v
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………..vii
LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………...…… xiii
LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………………………………….. xiv
CHAPTER
1.

2.

INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………. 1
1.1

Introduction……………………………………………………………… 1

1.2

Disclosure of Lower Probability Lawsuits……………………………….2
1.2.1

Prospective Investors……………………………………...…... 2

1.2.2

Long and Short Investors……………………………………… 3

1.3

Opportunistic Presentation of Lawsuits under a Lower Threshold……... 4

1.4

Overview of the Study…………………………………………………... 6

1.5

Preview of the Results…………………………………………………... 6

LITERATURE REVIEW……………………………………………………… 9
2.1

Introduction……………………………………………………………… 9

2.2

Debate over Loss Contingency Disclosures……………………………...9

2.3

Motivated Reasoning………………………………………………….... 11
2.3.1

Motivation to Reach an Accurate Conclusion or a
Preferred Conclusion…………………………………………. 11

2.3.2

Motivated Reasoning among Auditors and Tax
Professionals…………………………………………………...14

2.3.3

Motivated Reasoning among Nonprofessional Investors……...17

ix

2.3.4
2.4

Motivated Reasoning within Reasonableness Constraints…… 21

Dilution Effect…………………………………………………………...23
2.4.1

Dilution Effect in the Accounting Literature…………………. 25

2.5

Opportunistic Reporting by Management………………………………. 26

2.6

Methods of Persuasion…………………………………………………...29
2.6.1

Emphasis Framing……………………………………………..29
2.6.1.1

2.6.2

Persuasion Knowledge Model………………………………... 34
2.6.2.1

2.7
3.

Emphasis Framing in Accounting Contexts………... 31

Persuasion Knowledge Model in the Accounting
Literature……………………………………………. 37

Conclusions……………………………………………………………... 38

HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY……………………………………... 40
3.1

Introduction……………………………………………………………... 40

3.2

Development of Hypotheses……………………………………………. 40
3.2.1

Debate over SFAS 5: Threshold for Disclosing Loss
Contingencies…………………………………………………. 40

3.2.2

Investors‟ Motivated Reasoning Goals and Economic
Incentives……………………………………………………... 41

3.2.3

Prospective Investors‟ Judgments and Lowering the
Disclosure Threshold................................................................. 42

3.2.4

Long and Short Investors‟ Judgments: Motivated Reasoning
within Reasonableness Constraints…………………………… 44

3.2.5

Opportunism in Financial Reporting…………………………. 47

3.2.6

Opportunistic Presentation: Persuasion Knowledge Model
versus Emphasis Framing……….……………………………. 48
3.2.6.1

The Persuasion Knowledge Model…………………. 49

x

3.2.6.2
3.3

Emphasis Framing Theory………………………….. 51

Method………………………………………………………….………. 53
3.3.1

Participants……………………………………………………. 53

3.3.2

Experimental Task and Procedure……………………………. 54

3.3.3

Independent Variables………………………………………... 55
3.3.3.1

Investor Position……………………………………. 55
3.3.3.1.1

3.3.3.2

Pretests of Two Firms used in
Experimental Materials……………….. 57

Disclosure Type……………………………………...60
Opportunistic Disclosure Pretest………62

3.3.3.2.1
4.

DATA ANALYSIS……………………………………………………………... 63
4.1

Introduction……………………………………………………………... 63

4.2

Manipulation Checks…………………………………………………… 63

4.3

5.

4.2.1

Investor Position……………………………………………… 63

4.2.2

Disclosure Type………………………………………………. 64

Tests of Hypotheses……………………………………………...……... 65
4.3.1

Introduction…………………………………………………… 65

4.3.2

Test of H1……………………………………………………...66

4.3.3

Tests of H2a and H2b………………………………………… 68

4.3.4

Tests of H3a and H3b………………………………………… 69

4.4

Post-Experimental and Demographic Questions………………………...71

4.5

Summary of Results……………………………………………...……... 75

CONCLUSIONS……………………………………………………………… 76
5.1

Introduction……………………………………………………………... 76
xi

5.2

Discussion……………………………………………………………..... 77

5.3

Implications……………………………………………………………...78

5.4

Directions for Future Research…………………………………………. 79

APPENDIX: Research Instrument……………………………………………………..80
BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………… 111

xii

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

1

Participants by Experimental Condition…………………………………………54

2

Sample Demographic Data………………………………………………………55

3

Pretests of Firm Pairings………………………………………………………....59

4

Analysis of Covariance…………………………………………………………..66

xiii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

1

Investors‟ Motivated Reasoning within Reasonableness Constraints…………...46

2

Excerpt from Background Experimental Materials……………………………...57

3

Litigation Risk Assessments..................................................................................67

xiv

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1

Introduction
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5: Accounting for

Contingencies (SFAS 5) is the current guidance for disclosure of loss contingencies.
Under SFAS 5, loss contingencies, such as pending litigation, are required to be disclosed
when the probability is “at least reasonably possible” that a material loss may be incurred
(FASB 1975). Recently, the quality of firms‟ loss contingency disclosures has been
criticized by investors, and a debate has developed about whether or not SFAS 5 should
be amended (Desir et al. 2010). Investors have asserted that disclosures under SFAS 5 do
not adequately allow them to predict and assess the likelihood, amount, and timing of
future cash flows (FASB 2008; Desir et al. 2010). Investors further allege that too often
firms are not disclosing loss contingencies until a material loss has been incurred, leaving
them unable to appropriately incorporate contingencies into their judgments, which could
lead to a suboptimal allocation of investors‟ resources (Cheney 2008; Desir et al. 2010).
Because of the inherent vagueness in the verbal probability threshold under SFAS 5 of
“at least reasonably possible”, firms may be able to easily justify this lack of disclosure
even for lawsuits with higher probabilities of loss (e.g., Reimers 1992; Amer et al. 1995;
Piercey 2009).
In response to these concerns, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
issued Exposure Draft: Disclosure of Certain Loss Contingencies: An Amendment of
FASB Statements No. 5 and 141(R) in June 2008. The FASB proposed lowering the
probability threshold for disclosure of loss contingencies from “at least reasonably
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possible” to “more than remote” (FASB 2008, paragraph 5). This study investigates two
unintended consequences of lowering a disclosure threshold.
1.2

Disclosure of Lower Probability Lawsuits
The Exposure Draft states that this lower threshold would “expand the population

of loss contingencies that are required to be disclosed” (FASB 2008, p. vi). Thus, if the
probability threshold for disclosure is lowered to “more than remote”, the number of loss
contingencies that would be required to be disclosed should increase for many firms.
More recently, the FASB has also considered lowering the disclosure threshold even
further to include some remote losses (FASB 2009). Thus, any additional disclosures
that result from lowering the disclosure threshold would, by definition, relate to lawsuits
with low probability of losses.
1.2.1

Prospective Investors
Psychology theory suggests that adding low probability lawsuits could potentially

decrease investors‟ perceptions of litigation risk for the disclosure by decreasing the
influence of the higher probability lawsuits (Nisbett et al. 1981; Tetlock and Boettger
1989; Hackenbrack 1992; Glover 1997; Hoffman and Patton 1997; Shelton 1999). That
is, adding remote lawsuits to a disclosure may dilute, rather than add to, the impact of
reasonably possible lawsuits if investors rely on the representativeness heuristic when
judging the overall risk of loss due to disclosed litigation.
The representativeness heuristic is a natural cognitive strategy that people use to
assess the likelihood of an event by comparing the similarity of the information about the
event with other known events (Kahneman and Tversky 1972). The more similar the
information about the possible event is to other known events, the more likely the event is
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predicted to be (Nisbett et al. 1981; Zukier 1982; Tversky and Kahneman 1983; Frederick
and Libby 1986; Tetlock and Boettger 1989; Hackenbrack 1992).
For example, a higher probability lawsuit (i.e., a reasonably possible lawsuit) may
call to mind other lawsuits that have led to material losses. However, additional low
probability lawsuits may result in recollections of frivolous lawsuits. If investors rely on
the representativeness heuristic to assess litigation risk, they may not perceive the
additional, remote losses as adding to the reasonably possible loss, but rather lowering
the similarity between the overall disclosure and lawsuits that generally lead to material
losses. As a result, prospective investors may judge the firm‟s exposure to loss from the
disclosed litigation lower, even though more lawsuits are disclosed.
1.2.2

Long and Short Investors
When investors take a long or a short position in a firm, theory and prior research

suggest they hold the preferred conclusion that they will realize a positive return on their
investment, and thus, that their investment decision was appropriate (Hales 2007; Han
and Tan 2010; Thayer 2011). Consistent with their preferences for higher profitability
and share price, long investors are motivated to interpret litigation disclosures as more
favorable to the firm, while short investors (who require lower share prices in order to
profit) are motivated to interpret litigation disclosures as less favorable.
Motivated reasoning theory suggests that when decision makers are motivated to
arrive at a particular preferred conclusion, they use cognitive strategies that allow them to
reach their directional goals, within reasonableness constraints (Kunda 1990). That is,
people do not deliberately bias their judgments, but only reach a preferred conclusion to
the extent that they can maintain an illusion of objectivity (Pyszczynski and Greenberg
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1987; Kunda 1990). Under the lower disclosure threshold, long and short investors will
be motivated to perceive the likelihood of future losses consistent with their directional
preferences, subject to reasonableness constraints. As Kunda (1990) notes, individuals
tend to selectively use, interpret, and weight additional information in ways that support
their directional preferences (see also Wilks 2002). Thus, under the lower disclosure
threshold, long and short investors are likely to selectively search for and assimilate
newly disclosed information about additional, relatively trivial lawsuits in a manner
consistent with their motivated reasoning goals.
1.3

Opportunistic Presentation of Lawsuits under a Lower Threshold
Since firms have significant discretion in how they present these disclosures, it is

likely that some managers will use the lower threshold to direct attention from higher
probability lawsuits and portray the overall portfolio of contingent losses as favorably as
possible. Such a presentation strategy would be consistent with the opinion that
managers have already expressed regarding lower probability lawsuits (e.g., that they are
often frivolous or filed only for publicity purposes (The Wall Street Journal 2008)). In
addition, prior archival research provides evidence that managers try to present
information in a light most favorable to the firm when disclosing information in order to
persuade investors (Baginski et al. 2000; Schrand and Walther 2000). Thus, it is likely
that some managers will attempt to present disclosures under the lower threshold in as
favorable a light as possible.
Prior research has not examined how investors‟ directional preferences influence
their judgments when management uses the discretion afforded them in accounting
standards to strategically engage in opportunistic persuasion attempts. It is unclear a
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priori whether or not such a persuasion attempt would work as managers intend. I draw
upon the persuasion knowledge model (PKM) and emphasis framing theory to form
competing hypotheses for this effect.
PKM predicts that the influence of management‟s opportunistic presentation on
investors‟ judgments may depend on investors‟ perspective. For example, long investors,
preferring higher corporate profits / share prices, are more likely to be persuaded by
management‟s opportunistic presentation. However, short investors, preferring lower
corporate profits / share prices (so that they can personally benefit from their investment),
are more likely to be skeptical of management‟s opportunistic presentation (Friestad and
Wright 1994).
In contrast, emphasis framing theory predicts that this type of opportunistic
presentation can work as intended. According to this theory, communicators can
influence others‟ opinions by emphasizing particular considerations over other relevant
considerations when giving their interpretation of an issue (Nelson et al. 1997; Nelson
and Oxley 1999; Druckman 2001; McCaffery and Baron 2004; Maule and Villejoubert
2007; Slothuus 2008). For example, Shankar and Tan (2006) find audit preparers employ
emphasis framing to persuade reviewers by using language that emphasizes evidence that
supports their preferred conclusion and downplays evidence that contradicts their
conclusion. In addition, prior research demonstrates that strategic persuasion attempts
can be successful (Ricchuite 1999; Tan and Yip-Ow 2001; Kadous et al. 2005). This
suggests that, by strategically framing litigation disclosures, management may
successfully persuade investors to perceive the litigation in a more favorable light.
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1.4

Overview of the Study
In my experiment, nonprofessional investors were given financial statements and

legal disclosures for a hypothetical pharmaceutical company and were asked to assess the
likelihood of material loss due to disclosed pending litigation (i.e., litigation risk).
Participants were randomly assigned to a long, prospective, or short investment position,
and to one of three disclosure conditions. Participants received disclosures: (1) with a
probability threshold of “at least reasonably possible” (i.e., consistent with existing SFAS
5); (2) with a probability threshold of “more than remote” (i.e., consistent with the
FASB‟s proposed amendment); or (3) with a probability threshold of “more than remote”
(i.e., consistent with the FASB‟s proposed amendment) and an opportunistic reporting
strategy allowed by the lower threshold. The same reasonably possible lawsuit was
presented in all three disclosure conditions because both SFAS 5 and the proposed
amendment would require disclosure of lawsuits at this probability threshold. However,
in both lower probability threshold conditions, three additional lawsuits with a slightly
more than remote likelihood of leading to a material loss were also disclosed in either a
more objective manner or in a more opportunistic manner designed to persuade investors
to view the litigation, as a whole, as less serious.
1.5

Preview of the Results
The results of my study suggest that, when the probability threshold is higher (i.e.,

“at least reasonably possible”), investors assess the firms‟ litigation risk consistent with
their directional preferences. Specifically, long investors assess the lowest and short
investors assess the highest likelihood of firm loss, with prospective investors falling in
between. However, when the probability threshold is lower, adding low probability
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lawsuits to the reasonably possible lawsuit causes prospective investors to assess a lower
risk of loss to the disclosed litigation, even though more lawsuits are disclosed. In
addition, my findings suggest that firms can use an opportunistic presentation under a
lower threshold to deflect attention from higher probability to lower probability lawsuits,
which leads all investor types to perceive pending litigation more favorably for the firm,
despite their directional preferences. As such, prospective investors‟ and even short
investors‟ judgments converge toward long investors‟ already favorable judgments when
the disclosure threshold is lower and firms implement the opportunistic disclosure
strategy it allows.
The results of my study have several important implications. My experimental
design allows me to test potential unintended consequences of a proposed accounting
standard, holding other factors constant (Kachelmeier and King 2002). These findings
should be of interest to the FASB and other regulators as they consider modifications to
disclosure thresholds and the form these disclosures should take. Although the FASB‟s
goal in its exposure draft is to help investors make better judgments, these results should
inform the FASB, as well as investors, that investors‟ cognitive and motivational biases
may cause them to incorporate additional low probability lawsuits in a sub-optimal
manner. My study also has implications concerning the form that disclosures should
take. Under the lower threshold, managers would have both the incentive and the
discretion to report opportunistically. My findings suggest such an opportunistic
presentation can persuade all investors (long, prospective, and short) to view the litigation
less critically. Therefore, it would be prudent for investors to remain attentive for
management‟s persuasion attempts in an effort to decrease the influence of such attempts.

7

Further, policy makers may want to more carefully contemplate whether and how
pending litigation is disclosed, as such considerations can influence investors‟ judgments.
While the SFAS 5 debate provides a timely setting for studying the consequences
of expanding disclosure requirements, my findings may inform other situations in which
similar disclosure expansions are being considered. For example, in 2010, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) implemented new requirements that publicly traded
companies disclose any risks that climate change might pose to their future operations or
profits (SEC 2010). Firms could choose to disclose all risks objectively (i.e., present both
more and less remote risks in a transparent manner). Alternatively, as this new mandate
would require many firms to disclose more items, firms could use the new mandate to
disclose information opportunistically (e.g., strategically disclosing a number of very
remote risks to draw attention away from potentially more serious ones). Therefore,
similar unintended consequences could potentially take place in other settings in which
disclosure requirements are expanded, opening possible avenues for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1

Introduction
This chapter reviews several areas of literature to develop a framework for

studying the effects of lowering an accounting disclosure threshold on investors‟
judgments about firms‟ pending litigation. The second section discusses the recent
debate surrounding the disclosure of loss contingencies. The third and fourth sections
review the motivated reasoning and the dilution effect literatures, respectively. The fifth
and sixth sections review the opportunistic reporting and persuasion literatures,
respectively. Finally, the seventh section offers concluding remarks.
2.2

Debate over Loss Contingency Disclosures
Under the existing accounting standard for disclosure of loss contingencies, SFAS

5, management is required to disclose pending litigation if they believe the likelihood of a
material loss is “at least reasonably possible” (FASB 1975). Recently, however,
investors have asserted that too frequently firms are not disclosing loss contingencies
until the loss has already been realized, leaving them unable to adequately assess the risks
that companies are facing due to pending litigation (FASB 2008; Cheney 2008). In
response to investors‟ claims, the FASB issued an Exposure Draft (FASB 2008) which
proposes to lower the probability threshold for disclosure from “at least reasonably
possible” to “more than remote.” This would result in the disclosure of previously
undisclosed lawsuits that fall between these two thresholds.1 As the FASB (2008) notes,

1

Prior accounting research consistently finds that individuals judge the numerical equivalent of the phrase
“remote” to be substantially lower than “reasonably possible” (typically around 10 percent versus
approximately 50 to 60 percent) (Reimers 1992; Amer et al. 1994; Laswad and Mak 1997; Simon 2002).
Further, many other verbal probability phrases have been shown to be more than remote but not reasonably

9

lowering the probability threshold for disclosure would require many firms to disclose a
larger number of lawsuits.
Managers and attorneys from many companies are strongly against expanding
loss contingency disclosures. A recent Wall Street Journal editorial noted that: “Senior
litigators from 13 companies, including Pfizer, General Electric, DuPont, Boeing and
McDonald‟s have signed a letter to FASB Chairman Robert Herz, objecting to the plan.
„Too often, lawsuits are filed for publicity or to pressure companies, only to be dropped
later,‟ they wrote” (The Wall Street Journal 2008, August 7, p. A12). Herz later
responded, “The new disclosures are aimed at providing information earlier to existing
and potential investors in order to give them a greater understanding of the risks
companies are facing. I believe that information would improve their ability to make
informed investment decisions” (Herz 2008). Thus, the contentiousness of this issue
exists, in part, because firms assert that increased disclosures will lead to lower quality
judgments if investors do not assimilate the information appropriately, while investors
believe that increased disclosures will lead to better judgments since they will have more
transparent information.
In general, the effect of lowering an accounting threshold on users‟ judgments has
not been studied in the accounting literature. Thus, it is unclear how investors would
incorporate additional low probability lawsuits into their perceptions of the likelihood of
litigation losses. The recent debate surrounding the proposal to lower the threshold for
disclosure of pending litigation provides a timely setting in which to study this effect.

possible, suggesting there is a gap along the probability continuum between these two terms (Amer et al.
1994; Laswad and Mak 1997). Thus, the idea of lowering the threshold for disclosure is to require firms to
begin disclosing litigation that falls between these two probability thresholds (FASB 2008).
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2.3

Motivated Reasoning
Motivated reasoning has been studied extensively in the psychology literature as

well as a variety of other applied areas, such as accounting. Motivated reasoning is a
process by which a decision maker‟s preference for a particular conclusion results in a
tendency to search for and interpret evidence in an effort to support or otherwise justify
that conclusion (Kunda 1987, 1990, 1999; Pyszczynski & Greenberg 1987). Because of
this biased information search, decision makers are left with a biased set of evidence to
interpret (Klayman and Ha 1987; Kunda 1990). Further, motivated reasoning theory
suggests decision makers have a tendency to interpret this evidence in a manner
consistent with their preferred conclusions (Kunda 1990; Ditto and Lopez 1992; Kunda
1999). Thus, motivated reasoning results in both a biased information search and biased
interpretation of the resulting evidence. This tends to result in judgments that are more
consistent with decision makers‟ preferred outcomes.
2.3.1

Motivation to Reach an Accurate Conclusion or a Preferred Conclusion
Motivated reasoning theory predicts that decision makers are often motivated to

arrive at a particular preferred conclusion or at an accurate conclusion (Kunda 1990).
Prior psychology research suggests that when decision makers have a motive to arrive at
a preferred conclusion, they tend to engage in a biased and incomplete search for
information while overweighting preference-consistent evidence and underweighting
preference-inconsistent evidence (Kunda 1990; Ditto and Lopez 1992). Conversely,
when decision makers are motivated to be accurate, they expend more cognitive effort on
their task, attend to and process information more carefully, and generate and evaluate
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more hypotheses and more balanced sets of evidence (Kunda 1990; Ditto and Lopez
1992).
Psychology research suggests that information consistent with decision makers‟
preferences tends to be accepted with less scrutiny than information inconsistent with
their preferences (Kunda 1999). In a well-cited study, Ditto and Lopez (1992) performed
a series of experiments designed to test whether individuals are differentially skeptical of
information that is preference-consistent versus preference-inconsistent. In their first
experiment, participants were asked to decide which student (a likable student or a
dislikable student) was more intelligent. The results show that participants looked at
fewer items of information to determine that a dislikable student was less intelligent, but
more items of information to determine that a dislikable student was more intelligent.
However, in a control group where the students were described as equally likable (so
participants did not hold a preferred conclusion), participants required equal information
to make their judgment about intelligence. These results suggest that less information is
required to reach a preferred conclusion than a non-preferred conclusion, consistent with
motivated reasoning theory.
The second experiment in the Ditto and Lopez (1992) study asked participants to
perform a fictitious medical test to determine whether or not they had a particular enzyme
deficiency. The results show that participants led to believe they had the deficiency took
more time to make their final decision about the result and were more likely to engage in
a variety of behaviors to test and retest the validity of their result than participants led to
believe they did not have the deficiency. In addition, participants led to believe they had
the deficiency subsequently judged the accuracy of the test to be lower and rated the
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disorder as less serious and more common than participants led to believe they did not
have the deficiency. These results suggest that when individuals are faced with evidence
suggestive of a conclusion they prefer not to reach, they apply more scrutiny to the
evidence, engage in a more thorough evaluation, attempt to gather more additional
evidence, and spend more time on the task before arriving at a final conclusion.
A number of other psychology studies are consistent with the Ditto and Lopez
(1992) findings. For example, Liberman and Chaiken (1992) find that when a message
suggesting caffeine consumption is a threat to one‟s health was highly relevant to
participants (i.e., when they were consumers of caffeine), they were less likely to believe
in the validity of the message and found more weaknesses and fewer strengths with the
message than when the threatening message was irrelevant to participants (i.e., when they
were not consumers of caffeine). Edwards and Smith (1996) provide evidence that when
arguments are preference-inconsistent, they are scrutinized longer and in more depth, and
are also judged to be weaker than preference-consistent arguments. Ditto et al. (1998)
find that when participants received favorable medical diagnoses, their evaluations of the
accuracy of the diagnoses were not influenced by the probability of alternative
explanations, however, when the diagnoses were unfavorable, participants‟ accuracy
evaluations were influenced by the probability of alternative explanations. Lundgren and
Prislin (1998) find that when participants are motivated to reach a directional conclusion,
they spend more time reading arguments that are preference-consistent versus preferenceinconsistent. Together, this literature suggests that decision makers tend to search for,
accept, and use preference-consistent evidence more than preference inconsistent-
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evidence, and they tend to think of alternative interpretations for preference-inconsistent
evidence and scrutinize it more.
2.3.2

Motivated Reasoning among Auditors and Tax Professionals
Prior accounting research suggests that auditors and tax professionals engage in

motivated reasoning to arrive at judgments that are consistent with their preferred
conclusions (Cuccia et al. 1995; Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Wilks 2002; Kadous et
al. 2003; Kadous et al. 2008). If preferred conclusions are sub-optimal, this can lead to
poor judgment and decision making in a variety of accounting contexts (Bonner 2008).
Much of the research in this area of the accounting literature has focused on situations
where preferred conclusions are consistent with economic incentives. For example,
research has examined how auditors‟ and tax professionals‟ judgments are influenced by
their clients‟ or superiors‟ preferences (Cuccia et al. 1995; Hackenbrack and Nelson
1996; Kadous et al. 2003; Kadous et al. 2008; Wilks 2002).
One study demonstrating motivated reasoning among auditors is Hackenbrack
and Nelson (1996). In their study, they manipulated engagement risk by telling auditors
that their audit firm has either a high or a moderate exposure to fines, litigation, and loss
of reputation regarding the audit discussed in the case. In addition, they manipulated the
accounting standard used in the task by providing some auditors with a task that requires
the use of SFAS 5 and other auditors a task that requires the use of SFAS 77.
Participants were given two alternative reporting choices (i.e., one aggressive and one
conservative) that could be made depending on whether they believe uncollectible
receivables are reasonably estimable. They were told the client prefers the aggressive
option in all conditions. Auditors were asked to choose either the aggressive or
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conservative reporting option as well as to rate the degree to which they believe the
amount could be reasonably estimated. Results indicate that auditors tended to make
reporting decisions that were consistent with their incentives, and they used the vague
language in accounting standards (i.e., “reasonably estimable”) to justify their position.
When engagement risk was high, they tended to favor the conservative option under both
accounting standards. However, when engagement risk was lower they tended to favor
the aggressive option. This suggests that even though auditors are supposed to be
independent, they engage in motivated reasoning and justify their preferred conclusions
by using the vague language in SFAS 5 and SFAS 77 to rationalize their reporting choice.
Kadous et al. (2003) extend Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996) by investigating
whether requiring auditors to evaluate the quality of various accounting methods
mitigates (as regulators predicted) or exacerbates (as motivated reasoning theory predicts)
auditors‟ tendency to comply with clients‟ preferred methods. Interestingly, they found
that quality assessments actually exacerbate the influence of auditors‟ directional goals
on their acceptance of clients‟ preferred aggressive accounting treatments.
In addition to auditors‟ tendencies to reach the preferred conclusions of their
clients, auditors have also been shown to adopt their superiors‟ preferred conclusions
(Wilks 2002). In one experimental condition, participants were told that the partner was
concerned that, in prior years, his audit team was unduly optimistic in its evaluation of
evidence relevant to the going-concern task, while in another experimental condition,
they were told the partner feels past audit teams have been too pessimistic. In addition,
the timing of the partner‟s concern was manipulated by telling participants about the
partner‟s concern either immediately before or after they evaluated evidence items related
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to the going-concern task. Participants were then asked to evaluate twenty evidence
items pertaining to a client‟s going-concern status and then make a going-concern
judgment. The results indicate auditors who were told of the partner‟s concern before
evaluating evidence judged the individual evidence items and made going-concern
judgments that were more consistent with the partner‟s preferred conclusion than auditors
who were told about the partner‟s concern after evaluating the evidence. These findings
suggest that auditors engage in directional processing of evidence when they know the
audit partner‟s preferred conclusion prior to evidence evaluation.
Prior accounting research has also investigated the influence of tax professionals‟
preferred conclusions on their judgments. One study in this area is Cuccia et al. (1995).
Tax professionals in this study were given a description of a tax issue, relevant guidance
on the issue, a description of the client, and a fictitious practice standard. Tax
professionals‟ preferred conclusions were manipulated by describing the client as having
either an aggressive or a conservative preference for the preparation of their taxes.
Participants were asked to make a reporting decision (i.e., an aggressive or conservative
choice), to make an assessment of the evidence supporting their decision, and to interpret
the vague language used in the accounting standard. The results suggest that tax
professionals‟ judgments were more conservative when their client‟s preferences were
more conservative and more aggressive when their client‟s preferences were more
aggressive. Results also suggest tax professionals use the intrinsic vagueness in a verbal
accounting standard or in the facts to justify reporting decisions that are consistent with
their client‟s preferences.
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In more recent research, the influence of clients‟ preferred conclusions on tax
professionals‟ judgments has been shown to be reduced when the costs of making
inappropriate judgments are made salient (Kadous et al. 2008). Future research may
follow the lead of Kadous et al. (2008) by investigating other variables that may reduce
the influence of clients‟ preferred treatments on both auditors‟ and tax professionals‟
judgments.
Much of the research described above examines settings in which decision
makers‟ preferred conclusions are also consistent with their economic incentives. Thus,
the cognitive influence of auditors‟ and tax professionals‟ preferred conclusions on their
judgments is difficult to isolate when their preferred conclusions are also aligned with
their economic incentives (e.g., adopting the preferred conclusion of a client or audit
partner). It is possible that auditors and tax professionals are merely rationally reacting to
their economic incentives by interpreting evidence and making judgments consistent with
those incentives. Thus, the extent to which motivated reasoning in accounting settings is
purely a rational reaction to economic incentives versus a psychological bias resulting
from holding a preferred conclusion is difficult to determine in the auditing and tax
contexts studied to date (Hales 2007).
2.3.3

Motivated Reasoning among Nonprofessional Investors
Studying the influence of directional preferences on nonprofessional investors‟

judgments allows researchers to separate rational reactions to economic incentives from
the purely motivational biases predicted by motivated reasoning theory (Hales 2007).
According to economic theories, nonprofessional investors should process information
objectively in order to reach the most accurate conclusion about a particular investment
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(Hales 2007). If investors process information in a non-objective manner, it could lead to
a sub-optimal allocation of resources within their portfolios and, therefore, lower returns.
Prior accounting studies examining the influence of motivated reasoning goals on
nonprofessional investors‟ judgments show that nonprofessional investors tend to make
judgments consistent with the preferred conclusion that they will earn a positive return on
their investment, even though they have an economic incentive to be objective (Hales
2007; Han and Tan 2010; Thayer 2011).
The first study that examined the influence of directional preferences on
nonprofessional investors‟ judgments is Hales (2007). In his study, investor participants
were presented with a real (but unidentified) firm‟s EPS for the prior four years, along
with excerpts from press releases, individual analysts‟ and consensus forecasts, and
selected comments from analysts‟ reports. Investors‟ directional preferences were
manipulated by assigning participants to take a long or a short position in the firm. In
addition, half of the participants were provided with an earnings benchmark that was
three cents above the consensus analyst forecast and the other half were provided with a
benchmark that was three cents below the forecast. This created the following four
experimental conditions: (1) short investors receiving preference-inconsistent information
(i.e., an earnings benchmark above the consensus forecast), (2) short investors receiving
preference-consistent information (i.e., an earnings benchmark below the consensus
forecast), (3) long investors receiving preference-inconsistent information (i.e., an
earnings benchmark below the consensus forecast), and (4) long investors receiving
preference-consistent information (i.e., an earnings benchmark above the consensus
forecast). Participants were asked to make EPS forecasts for the firm, and were given a
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monetary incentive to be as accurate as possible by making forecasts as close to the
firm‟s real EPS as possible. Results suggest that investors tended to interpret information
differently depending on their investment position in the firm (i.e., long or short),
particularly when the information was preference-inconsistent. This is particularly
striking because participants also had a salient economic incentive to be objective and
make an accurate EPS forecast. Yet, they tended to agree with information that
suggested they might have a profit on their investment and disagree with information that
suggested they might have a loss, consistent with motivated reasoning theory. Thus,
Hales (2007) demonstrates that nonprofessional investors are influenced by their
preferred conclusions, even when they have an economic incentive to be accurate.
Thayer (2011) is another related study in this literature. In this study,
nonprofessional investors were assigned to either a long or a short investment position.
They were asked to choose one firm (out of two) in which to take that assigned position.
Following Hales (2007), half of the participants are provided with an earnings benchmark
that is four cents above the consensus analyst forecast and the other half are provided
with a benchmark that is four cents below the forecast. This design created four
experimental conditions which manipulated whether the information is good news (i.e.,
preference-consistent) or bad news (i.e., preference-inconsistent) with respect to the
profitability of the participant‟s investment position. Participants received quarterly
earnings information and historical stock prices for the past three years, as well as
consensus and ranges of four individual analysts‟ forecasts for the upcoming year. After
receiving the preference-consistent (or preference-inconsistent) information, participants
were given the option of searching for more information by viewing the analysts‟ detailed
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forecasts before making a final EPS forecast for their firm. Results suggest
nonprofessional investors searched for a greater amount of additional information after
receiving preference-inconsistent news about their investment than when they received
preference-consistent news, supporting the predictions of motivated reasoning theory.
Han and Tan (2010) is another recent study to examine the influence of
nonprofessional investors‟ directional preferences on their judgments. Nonprofessional
investors‟ directional preferences were manipulated by assigning participants to take a
long position, a short position, or no position in a firm (i.e., a control condition similar to
a prospective investor position). Participants were asked to make earnings forecasts and
investment-related judgments after receiving management‟s earnings guidance. Both the
valence (positive or negative news) and format (point estimate or range) of
management‟s earnings guidance was manipulated. The results suggest that
nonprofessional investors‟ directional preferences influenced their interpretations of
management‟s guidance more as the ambiguity of the guidance increased (i.e., when
guidance was positive and provided as range). The authors posit that the reason for this
is likely to be because a range is ambiguous and allows long and short investors to
interpret the range guidance in a manner consistent with their preferences. In addition,
since management has greater incentives to disclose good news than bad news, long
investors receiving good news from management may take it at face value, while short
investors may discount it as self-serving. The results demonstrate that nonprofessional
investors‟ judgments are influenced by the form and direction of management‟s earnings
guidance differently depending on their motivated reasoning goals.
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In general, this literature suggests that nonprofessional investors process
information differently depending on whether it is consistent or inconsistent with their
preferred conclusions about their investment, consistent with psychology research on
motivated reasoning. In an investment setting, unlike generic psychology settings, this
literature demonstrates that the influence of motivated reasoning goals persists even when
decision makers (e.g., nonprofessional investors) have an economic incentive to evaluate
information in an objective manner.
2.3.4

Motivated Reasoning within Reasonableness Constraints
Motivated reasoning theory also suggests that the influence of decision makers‟

preferred conclusions will be bounded by reasonableness constraints (Pyszczynski and
Greenberg 1987; Kunda and Sanitioso 1989; Kunda 1990, 1999). When a preferenceconsistent conclusion deviates from salient benchmarks, it becomes more difficult for
people to justify a preferred conclusion (Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987). A
sufficiently large deviation between the preferred conclusion and the information invokes
reasonableness constraints. That is, people do not overtly bias their judgments, but only
reach a preferred conclusion to the extent that they can maintain an illusion of objectivity
(Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987; Kunda 1990). Kunda notes (1999, p. 224),
“Motivation can color my judgment, but we are not at liberty to conclude whatever we
want to conclude simply because we want to. Even when we are motivated to arrive at a
particular conclusion, we are also motivated to be rational and to construct a justification
for our desired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer. We will draw
our conclusion only if we can come up with enough evidence to support it.”
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For example, Kunda and Sanitioso (1989) demonstrate how the influence of
motivated reasoning is bounded by reasonableness constraints. In their study, graduate
student participants‟ preferred conclusion was manipulated by providing them with the
results of a fictitious study that claimed academic success is related to either extroversion
or introversion. Participants were then shown a number of trait adjectives on a computer
screen one at a time. Participants were asked to respond to each trait by selecting
whether the trait described them or not. The results show participants led to believe
introversion was related to success tended to select fewer extroversion traits as selfdescriptive than did participants led to believe extraversion was related to success.
A number of studies in the accounting literature have investigated motivated
reasoning within reasonableness constraints. One such study is Kadous et al. (2003).
The findings of this study suggest that auditors‟ agreement with their clients‟ preferred
accounting treatment increases when auditors perform a quality assessment to determine
the most appropriate method. However, the authors posit that this can only occur to the
extent that the client‟s preferred treatment can be reasonably justified as a sufficiently
acceptable method.
Ng and Shankar (2010) investigate how advice from an audit firm‟s technical
department and the strength of the client‟s justification for their preferred treatment
moderate the findings of Kadous et al. (2003) by changing auditors‟ reasonableness
constraints. The results suggest that quality assessments do reduce auditors‟ agreement
with their client‟s preferred treatment when the audit firm‟s technical department
explicitly advises the use of the most appropriate method (which differs from the client‟s
preference) and when the client‟s justification for their preferred treatment is strong.
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The authors posit this occurs because the technical department‟s advice to use a more
appropriate method tightens auditors‟ reasonableness constraints, making it more difficult
for them to continue to support their client‟s preferred treatment when advised of a more
appropriate method. This effect is more observable when the client provides a strong
(rather than a weak) justification for their preference because auditors are more likely to
already agree with the client‟s preference when their arguments in favor of the treatment
are strong. Thus, when the client‟s justification is strong, there would be more room for
auditors‟ agreement to decrease (as their reasonableness constraints shift) in response to
the technical department‟s advice.
2.4

Dilution Effect
The weight decision makers give to certain items of information can be diluted

(i.e., reduced), when additional information is also considered. For example, the dilution
effect occurs when the presence of irrelevant information weakens the implication of
relevant information (Nisbett et al. 1981). The dilution effect was first documented in the
psychology literature, but it has also been studied in applied settings, such as accounting,
for many years. Typically, studies on the dilution effect show that judgments made using
both diagnostic and nondiagnostic evidence are less extreme than judgments made using
diagnostic evidence only. For example, Nisbett et al. (1981) is an early study of the
dilution effect. In that study, participants predicted the GPA of a student when they were
provided with only relevant information (i.e., they were told the student studied for either
3 hours or 31 hours per week). Participants moderated their judgments about the
student‟s GPA when they also received information that pretest participants judged to be
irrelevant (e.g., the number of plants the student kept).
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Throughout the literature, researchers have posited that the dilution effect results
because people use the representativeness heuristic to make likelihood assessments
(Kahneman and Tversky 1972; Tetlock and Boettger 1989; Hackenbrack 1992; Shelton
1999; Bonner 2008). The representativeness heuristic is a natural cognitive strategy that
people use to judge the likelihood of a potential event by comparing the similarity of the
information about the potential event with other known events (Kahneman and Tversky
1972). According to this theory, people will judge the likelihood of a potential event by
comparing the information about it to their mental representations of other known events.
The more similar the information about the potential event is to people‟s mental
representations of other known events, the higher their likelihood judgments are predicted
to be (Nisbett et al. 1981; Zukier 1982; Tversky and Kahneman 1983; Frederick and
Libby 1986; Tetlock and Boettger 1989; Hackenbrack 1992).
There have been several studies in the psychology literature that have investigated
boundary conditions of the dilution effect. For example, Zukier and Jennings (1983)
found that the dilution effect does not hold when the nondiagnostic information is
extreme and atypical. Further, other studies suggest that when people‟s beliefs about the
diagnosticity of the information are weak, the dilution effect does not hold (Ruble and
Stangor 1986; Higgins and Bargh 1987; Fiske and Neuberg 1990).
In an effort to investigate methods to debias the dilution effect, psychologists
have found a factor that unexpectedly amplifies the dilution effect. That is, Tetlock and
Boettger (1989) found that accountability exacerbates the dilution effect. The authors
suggest this probably occurs because accountability increases participants‟ complexity of
thought. As participants‟ thoughts become more complex and integrative, they tend to
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suffer from the effects of dilution more because they are more attentive to all of the
evidence provided.
2.4.1

Dilution Effect in the Accounting Literature
Studies investigating the dilution effect in accounting to date are generally set in

auditing contexts. Recently, researchers in accounting have begun to question whether
the dilution effects documented in auditing studies exist in other accounting settings, such
as investment settings (Bonner 2008).
In general, studies in the accounting literature are consistent with the dilution
effect. For example, Hackenbrack (1992) found evidence of the dilution effect in an
audit setting. He asked auditors to first make judgments about how much a company‟s
exposure to fraudulent reporting changed during a year when they were given both
diagnostic and nondiagnostic information. Then, he asked them to make the same
judgment using only diagnostic information. Findings show that auditors‟ probability of
fraud judgments were less extreme when both relevant and irrelevant information was
presented than when they received only relevant information.
Hoffman and Patton (1997) also find support for the dilution effect in an auditing
task. This study provides evidence that accountability does not exacerbate the dilution
effect among auditors. The authors argue this probably resulted since auditors tended to
make more conservative judgments when held accountable since they are trained to be
conservative and likely anticipate their superiors‟ preference for conservative judgments.
This result is contrary to the findings of Tetlock and Boettger (1989) in the psychology
literature, who suggest that accountability exacerbates the dilution effect. However, in
generic psychology studies participants could not anticipate the preferences of those to
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whom they were accountable, which could explain the reason for these divergent findings
across disciplines.
Prior work in this area of the accounting literature has found factors that moderate
the dilution effect. For example, Glover (1997) found that accountability had no
influence on the dilution effect, but that when auditors were put under time pressure, the
dilution effect was reduced but not eliminated. Shelton (1999) found that the dilution
effect was moderated by experience in an audit going concern judgment task. Auditors
with different levels of experience were asked to make a going concern judgment either
with only diagnostic evidence or with both diagnostic evidence and nondiagnostic
evidence. The results suggest that audit seniors‟ judgments suffer from dilution but audit
managers‟ and partners‟ judgments do not. This suggests that, as people gain expertise in
a field, they may become better at filtering out irrelevant information and only
incorporate relevant information into their judgments.
In general, findings in accounting are consistent with the dilution effect; however
there are some inconsistencies between the psychology findings and findings in auditing
settings. These inconsistencies are likely due to the unique audit environment. Since the
studies that have been done on the dilution effect in accounting are mostly in audit
settings, future research should investigate dilution effects in other accounting settings,
such as investment tasks. This would enable accounting researchers to further develop a
theory of dilution (Bonner 2008).
2.5

Opportunistic Reporting by Management
For a number of reasons (e.g., power, obtaining goals, being liked), we prefer to

present ourselves in the most favorable light possible to manage others‟ impressions of us
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(Baumeister 1982; Leary and Kowalski 1990; Nezlek and Leary 2002; Fiske and Taylor
2008). Similarly, managers of firms also prefer to present themselves and their firms in a
favorable light (Baginski et al. 2000; Schrand and Walther 2000). Hackenbrack and
Nelson (1996, p. 43) note, “Managers have incentives to use accounting standards to
report in ways that are in their best interest, even at the expense of stakeholders.”
Bloomfield (2002, p. 238) also notes, “Managers make many decisions motivated, at least
partly, by a desire to make it harder for investors to uncover information that the
managers do not want to affect their firms‟ stock prices.”
Management‟s propensity for opportunistic reporting is a well documented and
commonly studied in the accounting literature both experimentally and archivally
(Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Baginski et al. al 2000; Schrand and Walther 2000;
Bloomfield 2002; Barton and Mercer 2005; Krische 2005; Hirst et al. 2007). For
example, Baginski et al. (2000) report archival evidence suggesting management tends to
explain bad news in voluntary disclosures by attributing it to external factors outside of
management‟s control, but they tend to attribute internal causes to good news. Thus,
managers appear willing to take credit for things that go right, but distance themselves
from things that go wrong.
Barton and Mercer (2005) experimentally investigated how financial analysts
react to management‟s external attributions for bad news. They provided financial
analysts with historical financial statement information showing a firm that experienced
poor performance over the year. Two groups of analysts received management‟s
explanation for the poor performance, which provided an external cause for the bad news.
For half of the participants, management‟s explanation was plausible, and for the other
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half, the explanation was implausible. There was also a control group that did not receive
any explanation from management. Results show that when management‟s external
attributions were plausible, analysts made higher stock price judgments and earnings
forecasts than when the attributions were implausible. This suggests that if management
provides implausible external attributions for bad news in voluntary disclosures in an
attempt to persuade investors, it may not work as intended by management. Instead, it
may backfire among professional investors (e.g., analysts).
Further evidence of managers‟ tendencies to be opportunistic is provided by
Schrand and Walther (2000). They present archival evidence suggesting that managers
strategically select the prior-period earnings benchmark that they use to compare to
current earnings. Managers appear to be more likely to remind investors of a prior loss
than a prior gain. Including prior period losses but not prior period gains in an earnings
benchmark creates a lower benchmark which is used to compare to current earnings.
This creates the perception of a larger positive change in earnings. After providing
evidence of management‟s opportunistic choice of benchmark, the authors also provide
archival evidence that investors appear to be influenced by management‟s strategic
choice of benchmark. They provide an analysis of excess stock returns at the earnings
announcement date which suggests investors use the benchmark that managers provide to
evaluate current earnings.
Krishe (2005) experimentally investigates why managers‟ strategic choice of
earnings benchmark influences investors‟ judgments. Results suggest that
nonprofessional investors‟ evaluations of a firm‟s current period earnings were
influenced by whether or not management used earnings benchmarks which strategically
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included prior period losses but not prior period gains. These results are consistent with
the archival evidence provided by Schrand and Walther (2000). Further, results suggest
that the effect seems to be driven by limitations in nonprofessional investors‟ memories
for the prior period gain or loss. Results also suggest that when management reminds
investors of the prior period gain or loss in the current period earnings announcement,
this effect is reduced. In general, this stream of research suggests that nonprofessional
investors are influenced by the opportunistic disclosures of managers.
2.6

Methods of Persuasion
There are many theories of persuasion that have been studied in basic disciplines

such as psychology and in applied disciplines such as accounting, marketing, and
political science. For example, Emphasis Framing Theory (e.g., Nelson et al. 1997;
Druckman 2001) is a persuasion theory primarily developed in the political science
literature, and the Persuasion Knowledge Model (e.g., Friestad and Wright 1994) is a
persuasion theory primarily developed in the marketing literature. Although individual
persuasion theories differ in their specific predictions, they are all concerned with how a
person‟s attitudes or behaviors can be changed by the social influence of others (Bonner
2008; Fiske and Taylor 2008). Emphasis Framing Theory and the Persuasion Knowledge
Model are discussed in the following sub-sections. These theories have divergent
predictions about how investors‟ positions in a firm would influence how they respond to
management‟s opportunistic legal disclosures.
2.6.1

Emphasis Framing
Emphasis framing theory suggests communicators can influence others‟ opinions

by emphasizing particular considerations over other relevant considerations when giving
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their interpretation of an issue (Nelson et al. 1997; Nelson and Oxley 1999; Druckman
2001; McCaffery and Baron 2004; Maule and Villejoubert 2007; Slothuus 2008). For
example, a politician may strategically emphasize a particular issue (e.g., the economy),
over other relevant issues (e.g., foreign policy) during a campaign. Assuming economic
issues are a strength of the politician, framing the campaign around the economy may
allow the politician to persuade voters to perceive the economy as an important aspect of
the election and, in turn, make them more likely to vote for this candidate.
Emphasis framing theory has been primarily studied in the political science
literature. Nelson et al. (1997) examined emphasis framing effects by asking
undergraduate students to make judgments about the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) after
watching a local news story about a recent KKK rally. The researchers manipulated the
frame of the news story by reporting the rally in terms of the KKK‟s right to free speech
or in terms of the KKK‟s disruption of public order. In the free speech frame, the
reporter emphasized the right of KKK members to speak in public and the right of their
supporters and the public to listen to what they had to say. In the disruption of public
order frame, the reporter emphasized the disturbances that ensued during the rally which
included visuals of police officers in riot gear. Interestingly, when the news story was
framed in terms of free speech, participants‟ judgments tended to be more tolerant of the
KKK than when it was framed as a disruption of public order. The results of this study
suggest that by strategically emphasizing a particular relevant aspect of an issue,
communicators are able to influence individuals‟ judgments in a particular direction.
Nelson et al. (1997) note that, with emphasis framing, communicators of
politically persuasive messages “devote considerable effort toward influencing not only
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what information gets on the air but how it is presented” (Nelson et al. 1997, p. 224). A
communicator may introduce individuals to aspects of an issue that they were not
previously aware of, or were not previously considering, by framing an issue with a
subset of relevant information. Entman (1993) notes that framing effects depend on the
recipient‟s cognitive schemata. For example, Druckman finds that, while they still exist,
emphasis framing effects are less pronounced among people with expertise than without
expertise in the domain.
In general, this stream of research in the political science literature suggests that
emphasis framing effects are most prominent when the target of the message is not an
expert on the issue. This suggests that nonprofessional investors may be particularly
prone to emphasis framing effects in financial disclosures due to their lack of expertise in
the subject matter.
2.6.1.1

Emphasis Framing in Accounting Contexts
There are a few recent studies that investigate emphasis framing effects in

accounting settings (Tan and Yip-Ow 2001; McCaffery and Baron 2004; Shankar and
Tan 2006; Lambert and Agoglia 2010). These studies have investigated emphasis
framing in audit review and tax settings. To date, there has not been any emphasis
framing studies done in investment contexts. In general, these studies suggest that
auditors and tax professionals are persuaded by emphasis framing in certain accounting
contexts, but research on these effects in the accounting literature is just beginning.
Tan and Yip-Ow (2001) examine audit preparers‟ use of emphasis framing to
stylize workpapers that persuade reviewers. They used an experiment in which
participants reviewed the work of an audit preparer who had either concluded that the
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client‟s major customer‟s account was either collectable or uncollectable. The
participants were also provided workpapers that emphasized evidence which supported
the preparer‟s conclusion and downplayed evidence that did not support the conclusion or
workpapers with evidence that was not framed. Participants used the workpapers and
conclusion provided by the preparer to make their own assessment about the
collectability of a customer‟s account. Results suggest that reviewers placed less weight
on the preparer‟s conclusion when the workpapers were stylized versus neutral. This
suggests that reviewers may see through preparers‟ stylization attempts and do not seem
to suffer from emphasis framing effects in this setting. However, this finding appears to
be at odds with what would be expected based on emphasis framing theory from the
political science and mass media literatures. It is also somewhat inconsistent with other
recent auditing research which suggests that reviewers are often not very good at
adjusting for shortcomings in preparers‟ workpapers, and thus would be likely to suffer
from emphasis framing effects (Agoglia et al. 2009a; Agoglia et al. 2009b). These
inconsistencies could be due to the subtle nature of the framing manipulation in Tan and
Yip-Ow (2001). However, the underlying reasons could be investigated in future
research.
A more recent study on emphasis framing in the accounting literature is Shankar
and Tan (2006). This study examines the nature and extent of audit preparers‟ workpaper
justifications when their conclusions are either similar or dissimilar to a reviewer‟s
preferred conclusion. After reading case materials, auditors were asked to make an initial
assessment about whether to allow a client to provide footnote disclosure regarding the
collectability of accounts receivable or to require an allowance for doubtful accounts.
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Then, the next day, participants were informed of the reviewer‟s preferred treatment.
Participants were then asked to write a memo to the reviewer justifying their assessment
(made the day before) about the appropriate accounting treatment to use. Participants‟
tacit managerial knowledge and technical knowledge were measured independent
variables. The results show that audit preparers with high tacit managerial knowledge
were more likely than preparers with low tacit managerial knowledge to use emphasis
framing to strategically present audit evidence to support their conclusion when the
reviewer prefers the same accounting treatment. Technical knowledge did not moderate
this effect. These results suggest that audit preparers with high tacit managerial
knowledge use emphasis framing to persuade reviewers with similar preferences by using
language that emphasizes evidence that supports the their preferred conclusion, while
downplaying evidence that does not support their preferred conclusion.
Lambert and Agoglia (2010) examine emphasis framing in an audit review
context. Participants‟ task involved closing review notes on audit workpapers. The
review was either completed in a timely manner or with a time delay. After the review
was completed, participants were presented with seven review notes, four of which
contained a framing manipulation. Holding the reviewer‟s directive constant, the review
notes were framed by either emphasizing the importance of documentation in the
workpapers or by emphasizing the importance of drawing an appropriate conclusion.
The results suggest that conclusion-framed review notes resulted in greater effort levels
among preparers while closing the notes than documentation-framed review notes, but
only when the review was timely. This study demonstrates that the way an audit reviewer
frames review notes influences how preparers respond to their review notes.
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2.6.2

Persuasion Knowledge Model
Another theory that may predict how nonprofessional investors holding particular

investment positions in a firm react to opportunistic disclosures is the Persuasion
Knowledge Model (PKM). PKM predicts how people cope with the persuasion attempts
of others (Friestad and Wright 1994). This theory describes targets of persuasion as
“resourceful participants who pursue their own goals” in the interpretation of a persuasive
message and not merely passive information processors (Friestad and Wright 1994, p. 3).
Targets of a persuasive message are posited to consider their own goals or desired
outcomes and to select coping mechanisms that will enable them reach their goals
(Friestad and Wright 1994; Kirmani and Campbell 2004).
Consumers are thought to develop persuasion knowledge throughout life (Friestad
and Wright 1994). Persuasion knowledge is suspicion about marketers‟ ulterior motives
(Kirmani and Zhu 2007). Targets of persuasive messages are hypothesized to draw upon
their own persuasion knowledge to identify when a communicator is attempting to
persuade them (Friestad and Wright 1994; Kirmani and Zhu 2007). Importantly, PKM
predicts that targets will not always use coping mechanisms to try to resist persuasion
attempts. Instead they may be receptive to persuasion attempts if that information allows
them to reach their goals (Friestad and Wright 1994).
Campbell and Kirmani (2000) found that consumers apply their persuasion
knowledge to cope with the persuasion attempts of salespeople when salespeople‟s
persuasion motives are more salient to them. When salespeople‟s motives are more
salient, deep processing of the message is not necessary for consumers to use their
persuasion knowledge to process the interaction. However, when salespeople‟s
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persuasion motives are less salient to consumers, their use of persuasion knowledge
involves higher-order reasoning that requires they engage in deeper processing of the
interaction. In general, the results suggest that a target‟s persuasion knowledge is more
likely to be activated when the target expends more effort processing the persuasive
message.
Kirmani and Zhu (2007) extend the work of Campbell and Kirmani (2000). Their
study suggests that even when holding depth of processing constant, persuasion
knowledge can influence consumers‟ judgments differently depending on motivational
factors. Kirmani and Zhu (2007) examine the effect of an interesting motivational factor,
regulatory focus, on consumers‟ activation of persuasion knowledge. Regulatory focus is
the relationship between the motivation of a person and the way in which they achieve
their goal (Higgins et al. 1994). That is, people are thought to be motivated to reach their
goals in a way that either focuses on maximizing gains (i.e., promotion-focus) or focuses
on minimizing losses (i.e., prevention-focus). Promotion-focused people perceive their
goals as hopes and aspirations (e.g., I want to purchase a superior product, so I eagerly
process positive information about the product), while prevention-focused people
perceive their goals as duties and obligations (e.g., I want to purchase a superior product,
so I must be vigilant and make sure I process negative information about the product).
Promotion-focused people are more likely to focus on positive signals in information that
allow them to reach their goals. In contrast, prevention-focused people are more likely to
focus on negative signals in information that would prevent them from reaching their
goal. Kirmani and Zhu (2007) manipulate consumers‟ regulatory focus by priming
participants to either think about their hopes, dreams, and ideals or to think about their
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duties, obligations, and responsibilities prior to assessing an advertisement. They also
manipulated the salience of the advertiser‟s persuasive intent within the advertisement to
be low, medium, or high. They asked participants to assess their attitude toward the
advertised brand and their perceived quality of the brand. They also gathered measures
of participants‟ persuasion knowledge through a skepticism scale and thought protocols.
They found that when the advertiser‟s persuasive intent is medium or high, preventionfocused consumers are more likely to activate their persuasion knowledge than
promotion-focused consumers. The results of this study suggest that motivational factors
can influence how consumers‟ interpret persuasive advertising messages through
differential activation of persuasion knowledge.
Another related study in this literature is Kirmani and Campbell (2004). They
provide qualitative evidence about how consumers respond to salespeople‟s persuasion
attempts. They find that consumers‟ relationships with salespeople and experience with
persuasion interactively affect consumers‟ coping strategies. They conceptualize
consumers as either “goal seekers” or “persuasion sentries”. Goal seekers attempt to use
the salesperson to achieve their own goals, whereas persuasion sentries attempt to guard
against unwanted persuasion attempts. They find that consumers are more likely to be
goal seekers when they have a cooperative or highly dependent relationship with
salespeople. In contrast, consumers are more likely to be sentries when they have a
competitive or a task-oriented relationship with salespeople. The results of Kirmani and
Zhu (2007) have been tied to Kirmani and Campbell (2004). That is, sentry strategies
may be more likely to be used when consumers have a prevention-focus and seeker
strategies may be more likely to be used when consumers have a promotion-focus.
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In general, these results suggest that people with different motivations may be
differentially persuaded by a message. Since long, short, and prospective investors hold
different motivations with respect to a particular firm, they may be differentially
persuaded by management‟s opportunistic disclosures if PKM is a descriptive theory in
investment settings.
2.6.2.1

Persuasion Knowledge Model in the Accounting Literature
Most of the studies that have examined PKM have been marketing studies.

However, there have been a few studies in the accounting literature that have used PKM
to test predictions about how auditors and managers make judgments using persuasive
information.
For example, Rich et al. (1997) characterizes the audit review process from a
persuasion perspective that is based on the persuasion knowledge model. During the
review process, audit preparers are likely to present stylized workpapers to audit
reviewers in order to persuade reviewers that the work performed and conclusions
reached by the preparer are appropriate and justified. This study describes a number of
persuasion tactics that preparers can use to stylize their workpapers such as a biased
selection, ordering, and framing of evidence. The researchers also posit that audit
reviewers may learn coping strategies to deal with the persuasion attempts put forth by
preparers, but that reviewers may also be “co-composers” of the persuasive message
started by preparers as reviewers‟ work, in turn, is passed on to a superior. Consistent
with PKM, the authors theorize that reviewers‟ selection of coping mechanisms depends
on their own goals.
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Kadous et al. (2005) also draw upon the persuasion knowledge model in
developing their model of how quantified information influences managers‟ judgments.
The researchers note that conventional wisdom suggests that quantified information is
more persuasive than non-quantified information. However, they suggest that according
to PKM this may not always be the case. They develop and test a model in a setting
where a manager is writing a proposal intended to persuade colleagues to postpone
routine, but expensive, maintenance on machinery. The results of this study suggest that
managers will draw upon their persuasion knowledge to cope with the persuasion
attempts of colleagues presenting proposals. The extent of their coping strategies
depends on contextual factors related to the source of the message and the objectivity of
the information underlying the message itself.
Kaplan et al. (2008) is a recent auditing study suggesting that, as auditors become
more experienced, they develop persuasion knowledge which allows them to cope with
their clients‟ persuasion attempts. This study demonstrates that, as auditors gain
professional experience, they tend to be less accepting of management‟s self-serving
persuasive messages, presumably because auditors gain persuasion knowledge
throughout their careers.
2.7

Conclusions
In this chapter I have reviewed the literature from accounting, psychology,

marketing, political science, and other fields that is relevant to motivated reasoning
theory, the dilution effect, management‟s opportunistic reporting behavior, emphasis
framing theory, and the persuasion knowledge model. In the following chapter, I use this
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research to build hypotheses. I will also describe the experimental method I use to test
these hypotheses in the subsequent chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
3.1

Introduction
This chapter develops hypotheses and discusses the methods I used to test my

hypotheses. The second section draws upon relevant theory and prior research to develop
the hypotheses. The third section discusses the experimental methods that I used to test
my hypotheses.
3.2

Development of Hypotheses

3.2.1

Debate over SFAS 5: Threshold for Disclosing Loss Contingencies
Under the current accounting standard for disclosure of loss contingencies, SFAS

5, management must disclose pending lawsuits if they believe the likelihood of a material
loss is “at least reasonably possible” (FASB 1975). Recently, however, investors have
asserted that too often firms are not disclosing loss contingencies until the loss has
already been realized, leaving them unable to appropriately assess the risks that
companies are facing due to pending litigation (FASB 2008; Desir et al. 2010). In
response to investors‟ assertions, the FASB issued an Exposure Draft (FASB 2008)
which proposes to lower the probability threshold for disclosure from “at least reasonably
possible” to “more than remote.” This would result in the disclosure of previously
undisclosed lawsuits that fall between these two thresholds.2 As the FASB (2008) notes,

2

Recall that prior accounting research consistently finds that individuals judge the numerical equivalent of
the phrase “remote” to be substantially lower than “reasonably possible” (typically around 10 percent
versus approximately 50 to60 percent) (Reimers 1992; Amer et al. 1994; Laswad and Mak 1997; Simon
2002). Further, many other verbal probability phrases have been shown to be more than remote but not
reasonably possible, suggesting there is a gap along the probability continuum between these two terms
(Amer et al. 1994; Laswad and Mak 1997). Thus, the idea of lowering the threshold for disclosure is to
require firms to begin disclosing litigation that falls between these two probability thresholds (FASB 2008).
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lowering the probability threshold for disclosure in this way would require many firms to
disclose a greater number of lawsuits.
Managers and attorneys from many companies are strongly opposed to expanding
loss contingency disclosures. A recent Wall Street Journal editorial noted that: “Senior
litigators from 13 companies, including Pfizer, General Electric, DuPont, Boeing and
McDonald‟s have signed a letter to FASB Chairman Robert Herz, objecting to the plan.
„Too often, lawsuits are filed for publicity or to pressure companies, only to be dropped
later,‟ they wrote” (The Wall Street Journal 2008, August 7, p. A12). Herz later
responded, “The new disclosures are aimed at providing information earlier to existing
and potential investors in order to give them a greater understanding of the risks
companies are facing. I believe that information would improve their ability to make
informed investment decisions” (Herz 2008). Thus, the contentiousness of this issue
exists, in part, because firms argue that increased disclosures will lead to worse
judgments if investors do not incorporate the information appropriately, while investors
believe that increased disclosures will lead to better judgments since they will have more
transparent information.
3.2.2

Investors’ Motivated Reasoning Goals and Economic Incentives
Motivated reasoning theory suggests that decision makers often either have a

motive to arrive at a particular preferred conclusion or an accurate conclusion (Kunda
1990). Prior psychology research suggests that when decision makers have a motive to
arrive at a preferred conclusion, they tend to conduct a biased and incomplete search for
information while overweighting preference-consistent evidence and underweighting
preference-inconsistent evidence (Kunda 1990; Ditto and Lopez 1992). Conversely,
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when decision makers are motivated to be accurate, they expend more cognitive effort on
their task, attend to and process information more carefully, and generate and evaluate
more hypotheses and more balanced sets of evidence (Kunda 1990; Ditto and Lopez
1992). While increased cognitive effort has been shown to improve judgment quality in
many circumstances, it also has been shown to amplify certain judgment biases (Tetlock
and Boettger 1989; Hackenbrack 1992; Hoffman and Patton 1997).
Prior accounting research suggests that auditors, managers, tax professionals, and
investors engage in motivated reasoning to arrive at judgments that are consistent with
their preferred conclusions (Wilks 2002; Kadous et al. 2003; Hales 2007; Kadous et al.
2008; Han and Tan 2010; Ng and Shankar 2010; Peecher et al. 2010; Thayer 2011).
Motivated reasoning among investors is a particularly interesting phenomenon because
investors also have a concurrent economic incentive to reach the most objective
conclusion about the investment value of a particular firm (Hales 2007). Objectivity is
economically important to investors because processing information in a non-objective
manner could lead to a sub-optimal allocation of resources within their portfolios and,
therefore, lower returns.
3.2.3

Prospective Investors’ Judgments and Lowering the Disclosure Threshold
Consistent with their economic incentives, prospective investors have a motivated

reasoning goal to reach an objective conclusion when evaluating a potential firm (Han
and Tan 2010). Since they have not yet made an investment decision, they should not
hold a preferred conclusion about a particular stock. Under the existing SFAS 5
threshold, the disclosed lawsuit has an “at least reasonably possible” likelihood of leading
to a material loss. Thus, I expect that under this disclosure threshold, prospective

42

investors‟ judgments will represent a relatively objective probability assessment of the
“at least reasonably possible” lawsuit and will not be directionally biased by a particular
preferred conclusion.
However, under a lower disclosure threshold such as the one proposed by the
FASB (2008), firms would be required to disclose additional low probability lawsuits.
Prior research in psychology and accounting suggests that disclosure of additional low
probability lawsuits may dilute the influence of the reasonably possible lawsuit, leading
prospective investors to assess the risk of litigation lower even though more lawsuits are
disclosed (Nisbett et al. 1981; Tetlock and Boettger 1989; Hackenbrack 1992; Glover
1997; Hoffman and Patton 1997; Shelton 1999).
Specifically, adding remote losses to a disclosure may dilute, rather than add to,
the impact of reasonably possible losses if investors rely on the representativeness
heuristic when assessing the overall risk of loss due to disclosed litigation. The
representativeness heuristic is a natural cognitive strategy that people use to judge the
likelihood of a potential event by comparing the similarity of the information about the
potential event with other known events (Kahneman and Tversky 1972). If information
about the potential event is sufficiently similar to other known events, people tend to
judge the potential event as more likely to occur. According to this theory, prospective
investors will judge a firm‟s likelihood of material loss (i.e., likelihood of the potential
event) by comparing the firm‟s litigation disclosures (i.e, the information about the
potential event) to their mental representations of lawsuits that generally lead to material
losses (i.e., other known events). The more similar the firm‟s disclosures are to
prospective investors‟ mental representations of lawsuits that generally lead to material
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losses, the higher their perceptions of the firm‟s litigation risk are predicted to be (Nisbett
et al. 1981; Tetlock and Boettger 1989; Hackenbrack 1992).
For example, a higher probability lawsuit (i.e., a reasonably possible lawsuit), is
consistent with the mental representation of a lawsuit that generally leads to a material
loss. However, additional low probability lawsuits are inconsistent with the mental
representation of lawsuits that generally lead to a material loss. If investors rely on the
representativeness heuristic to form their overall perceptions of firm loss, they may not
view additional, remote losses as adding to the reasonably possible loss, but rather
lowering the similarity between the overall disclosure and prospective investors‟ mental
representations of lawsuits that generally lead to material losses. As a result, they will
judge the firm‟s exposure to loss from the disclosed litigation lower, even though more
lawsuits are disclosed. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: Prospective investors will judge the risk from disclosed litigation lower
under the lower “more than remote” threshold than under the higher “at least
reasonably possible” threshold, even though additional lawsuits are disclosed.
3.2.4

Long and Short Investors’ Judgments: Motivated Reasoning within
Reasonableness Constraints
Motivated reasoning theory suggests that when decision makers are motivated to

arrive at a particular preferred conclusion, they employ cognitive strategies that enable
them to reach their directional goals (Kunda 1990). When investors take a long or a short
position in a firm, theory and prior research suggest they hold the preferred conclusion
that they will realize a positive return on their investment, and thus, that their investment
decision was sound (Hales 2007; Han and Tan 2010; Thayer 2011). Consistent with their
preferences for higher profitability and share price, long investors are motivated to
interpret litigation disclosures as more favorable to the firm, while short investors (who
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require lower share prices in order to profit) are motivated to interpret litigation
disclosures as less favorable. When judging the likelihood of loss under the higher SFAS
5 threshold, I expect that long and short investors will interpret the “at least reasonably
possible” lawsuit in a manner consistent with their respective directional goals (cf. Kunda
1990; Hales 2007; Han and Tan 2010; Thayer 2011). Thus, long investors are likely to
assess lower litigation risks than short investors under the existing SFAS 5 threshold.
Motivated reasoning theory also suggests that the influence of decision makers‟
preferred conclusions will be bounded by reasonableness constraints (Kunda 1990). That
is, people do not overtly bias their judgments, but only reach a preferred conclusion to the
extent that they can maintain an illusion of objectivity (Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987;
Kunda 1990). For example, while long (short) investors are motivated to view
disclosures in a more favorable (unfavorable) light, the potential for actual investment
losses also provides strong pressure to maintain some sense of reasonableness in their
beliefs about an investment rather than simply believing what they want to believe about
it (Hales 2007). When factors are present that make reasonableness constraints more
salient in settings such as these, directional motivated reasoning goals (while strong) can
also become quickly bounded (Peecher et al. 2010). Thus, investors‟ long or short
positions can provide them with strong directional goals that will likely bias their
judgments, but can also provide them with similarly strong reasonableness constraints
that limit further motivated reasoning (see Figure 1).
Under the lower disclosure threshold, long and short investors will be motivated
to view the likelihood of future losses consistent with their directional preferences,
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FIGURE 1
Investors’ Motivated Reasoning
within Reasonableness Constraints

Short investors
Perceived
litigation
risk

Long investors
Reasonableness
constraints

Directional goal strength
Note:
When directional goal strength is low, directional goals have little observable influence
on investors‟ litigation risk judgments. As directional goal strength increases along the
X-axis, investors will increasingly engage in motivated reasoning, with long (short)
investors decreasing (increasing) their judgments until they approach their reasonableness
constraint at which point they can no longer justify further decreases (increases) (see also
Kadous et al. 2003, Figure 1).

subject to reasonableness constraints. As Kunda (1990) notes, individuals tend to
selectively use, interpret, and weight additional information, and use other cognitive
heuristics, in ways that support their directional preferences (see also Wilks 2002). Thus,
under the lower disclosure threshold, long and short investors are likely to selectively
search for and assimilate newly disclosed information about additional, relatively
inconsequential lawsuits in a manner consistent with their motivated reasoning goals.
46

For example, long investors could selectively focus constraints (Figure 1). However, if
they are not already at the bounds of their reasonableness constraints under the higher
disclosure threshold, there would be room for their judgments to move in the directions
consistent with their respective motivated reasoning goals. This leads to the following
hypotheses:
H2a: Long investors‟ judgments of litigation risk under the lower “more than
remote” threshold will be less than or equal to their judgments under the higher
“at least reasonably possible” threshold.
H2b: Short investors‟ judgments of litigation risk under the lower “more than
remote” threshold will be greater than or equal to their judgments under the
higher “at least reasonably possible” threshold.
3.2.5

Opportunism in Financial Reporting
For a variety of reasons (e.g., power, obtaining goals, being liked), we prefer to

present ourselves in the most favorable light possible to manage others‟ impressions of us
(Baumeister 1982; Leary and Kowalski 1990; Nezlek and Leary 2002; Fiske and Taylor
2008). Similarly, managers of firms also prefer to present themselves and their firms in a
favorable light (Baginski et al. 2000; Schrand and Walther 2000). Prior accounting
research suggests that management tends to behave opportunistically when disclosing
information (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Baginski et al. 2000; Schrand and Walther
2000; Bloomfield 2002; Barton and Mercer 2005; Krische 2005; Hirst et al. 2007). For
example, Baginski et al. (2000) report archival evidence suggesting managers tend to
explain bad news in voluntary disclosures by attributing it to temporary external factors
outside of their control, possibly to persuade investors to interpret the bad news more
favorably. Also, Schrand and Walther (2000) provide archival evidence suggesting
managers are more likely to include a prior-period loss than a prior-period gain in the
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earnings benchmark they use to compare to current earnings, presumably to strategically
create the perception of the largest positive change possible.
The proposed changes to SFAS 5 lend themselves to a specific type of
opportunistic reporting that is unique to settings in which thresholds are lowered. Since
lowering the disclosure threshold would cause firms to disclose additional low
probability lawsuits, firms can use this to their advantage. Specifically, since the FASB‟s
amendment does not specify how the disclosures should be presented, managers could
portray the entire disclosure as a portfolio consisting mostly of remote, and therefore
frivolous, lawsuits that they only disclose to comply with the proposed rule. Such a
presentation strategy would be consistent with the view that managers have already
expressed regarding lower probability lawsuits (e.g., that they are often frivolous or filed
solely for publicity purposes (The Wall Street Journal 2008)). Without changing the
fundamental information they provide about each lawsuit, managers could focus attention
away from reasonably possible lawsuits to the more remote ones.
3.2.6

Opportunistic Presentation: Persuasion Knowledge Model versus Emphasis
Framing
It is unclear a priori whether or not such a persuasion attempt would work as

managers intend. The Persuasion Knowledge Model predicts that an opportunistic
presentation may successfully persuade investors only when it helps them reach their
directional conclusions (i.e., long investors), but it may backfire when it is inconsistent
with their directional conclusions (i.e., short investors). Alternatively, Emphasis Framing
Theory predicts an opportunistic presentation may successfully persuade investors,
despite their motivated reasoning goals, to view pending litigation more favorably.

48

3.2.6.1.

The Persuasion Knowledge Model
The Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM) predicts that investors will be

persuaded by management‟s opportunism if it allows them to reach their preferred
conclusions. PKM is a theory developed in the marketing literature that predicts how
people cope with the persuasion attempts of others (Friestad and Wright 1994). Targets
of a persuasive message are described as not merely passive information processors, but
rather as resourceful participants who consider their own goals or desired outcomes and
select coping mechanisms that will enable them reach their goals (Friestad and Wright
1994; Kirmani and Campbell 2004). PKM predicts that targets will not always actively
resist persuasion attempts, but instead may be receptive to persuasion attempts if it allows
them to reach their own goals (Friestad and Wright 1994).
Investors taking a long position in a firm want to believe management‟s
opportunism is earnest, as it helps them reach their preferred conclusion (i.e., that the
company they have invested in will perform strongly). PKM predicts that long investors
will be less likely to actively guard against management‟s opportunistic persuasion
attempt and, thus, are likely to be persuaded by it (Campbell and Kirmani 2000). In
contrast, short investors want to believe the company will not perform strongly, which is
contrary to management‟s interpretation. Short investors are more likely to spend greater
effort critically processing management‟s opportunism, and thus more likely to perceive
management‟s presentation as a persuasion attempt (Friestad and Wright 1994; Campbell
and Kirmani 2000). If so, PKM predicts management‟s opportunism will backfire for
short investors and lead them to further increase their loss likelihood judgments (Friestad
and Wright 1994). Since prospective investors are motivated to be objective, they are
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likely to continue to remain fairly neutral with respect to management‟s persuasion
attempts and, in turn, objectively assess the information management is opportunistically
disclosing and its influence on litigation risk. Thus, PKM suggests management‟s
opportunistic presentation would amplify the effect of investors‟ motivated reasoning
goals on their litigation risk assessments.
The extent to which investors‟ directional interpretations of management‟s
opportunism further decreases long investors‟ and increases short investors‟ litigation risk
judgments depends on how close they already are to the bounds of reasonableness
constraints when management presents the additional low probability lawsuits in a more
objective manner. If investors are already close to their reasonableness constraints in the
objective amendment condition, when management presents the lawsuits
opportunistically, there may be little room for long investors‟ judgments to decrease and
short investors‟ judgments to increase and still be within their reasonableness constraints.
However, if investors are not already at the limits of their reasonableness constraints in
the objective amendment condition, there would be room for their judgments to move in
the directions consistent with their respective motivated reasoning goals. This would
lead to greater differences between investors‟ judgments when disclosures are presented
in a more opportunistic manner than when they are presented in a more objective manner.
The following hypothesis will be tested:
H3a: The differences across long, prospective, and short investors‟ litigation risk
judgments when litigation disclosures are presented opportunistically under the
lower threshold will be greater than or equal to the differences when litigation
disclosures are presented more objectively under the lower threshold.
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3.2.6.2

Emphasis Framing Theory
In contrast to PKM, emphasis framing theory predicts that management‟s

opportunistic presentation will work as intended, despite investors‟ motivated reasoning
goals. According to this theory, communicators can influence others‟ opinions by
emphasizing particular considerations over other relevant considerations when giving
their interpretation of an issue (Nelson et al. 1997; Nelson and Oxley 1999; Druckman
2001; McCaffery and Baron 2004; Maule and Villejoubert 2007; Slothuus 2008). For
example, Shankar and Tan (2006) find audit preparers use emphasis framing to persuade
reviewers by using language that emphasizes evidence that supports their preferred
conclusion and downplays evidence that contradicts their conclusion. In addition, prior
research demonstrates that strategic persuasion attempts can be successful (Ricchuite
1999; Tan and Yip-Ow 2001; Kadous et al. 2005). This suggests that, by strategically
framing litigation disclosures, management may successfully persuade investors to
perceive the litigation in a light most favorable to the firm.
Under the recently proposed lower probability threshold, managers would now
have a mechanism to persuade investors to see the litigation in a more favorable light. A
lower threshold would allow managers to point out that the accounting standard requires
disclosure of lawsuits with very small probabilities of material loss and would provide
investors with examples of such lawsuits. These low probability examples may increase
the credibility of management‟s opportunistic presentation and lead investors to interpret
the disclosed litigation, on the whole, as fairly innocuous.
Motivated reasoning theory would predict this type of opportunistic disclosure to
influence different types of investors differently, depending on their motivated reasoning
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goals. Even without the opportunistic presentation of the litigation, long investors are
likely already assessing the likelihood of firm loss as low as they can within
reasonableness constraints. An opportunistic presentation would further decrease their
judgments only if they are not already at the bounds of their reasonableness constraints
when the same lawsuits are disclosed more objectively (and then only to the extent of
their bounds). In contrast, short investors are likely to interpret the more objective
disclosure of the lawsuits as suggesting the highest litigation risk that they can reasonably
justify. If these investors are persuaded by management‟s opportunism as suggested by
emphasis framing theory, their perceptions of litigation risk have much more room to
decrease than long investors‟ judgments. These investors still have motivations to
interpret the disclosure as unfavorably for the firm as they can reasonably justify.
However, if management‟s opportunistic presentation is successful, they may find it more
difficult to rationalize a negative interpretation of the disclosure and, in turn, assess the
likelihood of firm losses lower (their directional goals notwithstanding). Thus,
persuasive opportunistic disclosures can shift the reasonableness constraint on short
investors‟ natural goals to assess the likelihood of loss as high as possible. Factors that
shift reasonableness constraints against individuals‟ preferences tend to counteract the
effects of directional goals to reach a preferred conclusion (e.g., Peecher et al. 2010, Ng
and Shankar 2010). The extent to which prospective investors‟ judgments can similarly
decrease in response to management‟s opportunism depends upon how strongly the
assimilation effect predicted in H1 already decreased their judgments (i.e., how close
they already are to the lowest reasonable judgment in the objective amendment condition
due to a heuristic incorporation of additional low probability lawsuits).

52

Thus, emphasis framing theory predicts that management‟s opportunistic
presentation will tend to persuade all investors, leading them all to assess the firm‟s
litigation risk to be relatively low, within reasonable limits. As a result, the differences
across long, prospective, and short investors‟ perceptions of the firm should be smaller
when disclosures are presented in a more opportunistic manner than when the same
lawsuits are presented in a more objective manner. The following hypothesis will be
tested:
H3b: The differences across long, prospective, and short investors‟ litigation risk
judgments will be smaller when litigation disclosures are presented
opportunistically under the lower threshold than when they are presented more
objectively under the lower threshold.
3.3

Method

3.3.1

Participants
Consistent with prior research, I use graduate business students as a source for

nonprofessional investors (e.g., Maines and McDaniel 2000; Sedor 2002; Barton and
Mercer 2005; Krishe 2005; Mercer 2005; Elliott et al. 2007; Hales 2007; Elliott et al.
2010; Han and Tan 2010; Thayer 2011). One hundred fifty individuals enrolled in MBA
courses served as my participants (see Table 1 for number of participants by experimental
condition).3 On average, participants had approximately seven years of professional
business experience, and 95% had previously invested or planned to invest in the stock
market (see Table 2 for sample demographic data).

3

A substantial majority of the participants (117) were enrolled as MBA students, with another 32 enrolled
in similar programs (e.g., Master of Management Practice). Results are unchanged if only those identifying
themselves as MBA students are included in the sample. Nonprofessional investors are an important group
to study in this setting, as they own one-third of all U.S. stocks (Bogle 2006). As of 2005, 23.3 million
people held shares of individual companies‟ stock outside of employer plans (Elliott et al. 2010). Research
in finance suggests that this class of investors influences security prices (DeLong et al. 1989, 1991).
Furthermore, the FASB has expressed their concern for nonprofessional investors in the debate over the
proposed changes to SFAS 5 (Herz 2008).
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3.3.2

Experimental Task and Procedure
Participants completed a web-based instrument which I developed using Qualtrics

(see appendix for screen shots of the instrument). The case asked participants to evaluate
financial information relating to a hypothetical pharmaceutical firm. Participants
received the firm‟s income statements and balance sheets for each of the last three years,

TABLE 1
Participants by Experimental Condition
Disclosure Type
Investor
Position

SFAS 5

Objective
Amendment

Opportunistic
Amendment

Long

n = 21

n = 16

n = 15

Prospective

n = 19

n = 18

n = 16

Short

n = 16

n = 12

n = 17

along with financial statement disclosures regarding pending litigation. After examining
the firm‟s financial statements and legal disclosures, participants assessed the likelihood
that the firm will incur a future material loss due to the disclosed litigation (i.e., litigation
risk). I asked participants for the likelihood of loss due to the disclosed litigation (rather
than all litigation) to insure the internal validity of my tests of H1 and H2.4 Participants
recorded their responses on an eleven-point scale, where 0 = “material loss not at all

4

That is, if an individual presumes any undisclosed (below-the-disclosure-threshold) lawsuits exist, these
suits should not factor into the individual‟s assessment of risk due to disclosed litigation. Thus, any
decrease in this assessment when low probability lawsuits are included in the disclosure is unambiguously
non-normative.
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likely” and 10 = “material loss very likely.” Participants then answered a series of caserelated and demographic questions, including manipulation checks.
3.3.3

Independent Variables

3.3.3.1

Investor Position
Two independent variables (investor position and litigation disclosure type) were

manipulated between participants resulting in a 3×3 analysis of variance (ANOVA)

TABLE 2
Sample Demographic Data

Panel A: Proportion of participants who invested in the past or planned to do so in the
future
n

percent

Yes

142

94.7

No

8

5.3

Panel B: Gender

Male
Female

n
96
54

percent
64
36

Panel C: Participants’ professional and academic experience
Sample
Mean

Standard
Deviation

Years of Professional Experience

6.98

6.20

Number of Accounting Courses Taken

3.25

2.60

Number of Finance Courses Taken

2.53

2.21

Demographic Variable
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design. I manipulated investor position at three levels: long, short, and prospective. All
participants read summary financial information relating to two pharmaceutical firms (see
Figure 2). Following Thayer (2011), I designed these firms to have similar investment
potential, and pretested this summary information on 59 masters of accounting students
to ensure that the two firms were equally attractive (p = 0.865) and chosen with equal
frequency (p = 0.369) (pretest discussed in more detail in following subsection). Long
(short) investors then chose one of the two firms in which to invest (sell short), aware that
they would receive $15 if their chosen firm outperformed (underperformed) the other
firm, or $5 otherwise (adapted from Thayer 2011 and Han and Tan 2010). Prospective
investors were told that they would receive $10 for evaluating one of the two firms,
selected at random by the computer (adapted from Han and Tan 2010). All participants
then evaluated the financial statements of the selected firm, which I held constant for
both firms (as in Thayer 2011).5 Thus, long and short investors had directional
preferences for their chosen investment, which could influence their beliefs about the
financial statements they would evaluate, while prospective investors evaluated the same
financial statements without directional preferences.
Having participants choose an investment for which they will actually be paid
based on their investment position is a fairly strong manipulation of directional
preferences (Thayer 2011), especially compared to other accounting research that merely
gives participants the directional preferences of fictional sources (e.g., audit supervisors,
clients). I feel that this is an appropriate design choice in my setting given that real-world
investors face similar economic consequences when choosing among firms in which to
5

As the summary information for both firms is based on the same underlying set of financial statements,
the subsequent financial statements and disclosures participants received were identical regardless of which
of the two firms was selected.
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invest. As a result, my experimental participants (like real-world investors) will be likely
to have both relatively strong directional goals and relatively salient reasonableness
constraints (as discussed in H2a and b).
3.3.3.1.1

Pretests of Two Firms used in Experimental Materials

Prior to gathering data for my main experiment, I ran two pretests to ensure that
the firms presented in Figure 2 were approximately equally attractive investments and

FIGURE 2
Excerpt from Background Experimental Materials

Note:
All participants were given this summary information prior to evaluating the selected firm. Long
and short investors were asked to pick one of these two firms in which to take their assigned
investment position. Prospective investors were also given this information, but were not asked to
pick a firm. Instead, prospective investors were told they would be asked to objectively evaluate
one of these two firms (subsequently chosen at random by the computer).
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would be chosen by participants with approximately equal frequencies, following Thayer
(2011). For both pretests, I presented participants with four different pairs of firms (see
Figure 2), including the two that were ultimately used in the main experiment.
The four pairs of firms were developed by me. I included three financial
statement ratios and four qualitative statements for each firm in each pair. This was done
to create different firms with similar investment potential within each pair. The financial
statement ratios were developed from the same underlying financial statements within
each pair, but the actual ratios shown for each firm were different (e.g., Return on Assets
is presented for one firm versus Return on Equity for the other). I created some of the
qualitative statements and adapted others from Thayer (2011). My goal was to create
pairs of firms that had similar investment potential, but that appeared to have unique
characteristics so that participants felt there was a choice between the firms. That is,
while I did not want one firm to clearly outperform the other, I wanted them to be
different on some (non-financial) dimensions so that participants might genuinely have a
preference for one over the other (in an effort to increase the likelihood the feel
“invested” in their company).
In the first pretest, 31 masters of accounting students were presented with these
four different pairs of firms.6 For each pair, I asked participants to make a choice to
invest in one of the two firms. The results of the pretest (displayed in Table 3) showed
that 18 participants chose Karlow and 13 chose Bower (the two firms used in the
experimental materials), indicating that each firm was chosen with similar frequency (χ2
= 0.806, p = 0.369).
6

To control for any possible order effects, I presented the four pairs of firms in reverse order to half of the
participants in both pretests. No significant differences were found between participants that received the
four pairs in the original order or in the reverse order.
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In a second pretest, 28 masters of accounting students were asked to rate the
investment attractiveness of each firm from each of the four pairs on scales of 0 (not
attractive) to 10 (very attractive). Pretest participants rated Karlow (mean = 7.39) and
Bower (mean = 7.32) as approximately equally attractive investments (t = 0.171, p =
0.865). Ultimately, I chose the Karlow and Bower pair for the main experiment because
they were both chosen with similar frequency and their attractiveness ratings were the
most similar among all the pairs.

TABLE 3
Pretests of Firm Pairings

Pair
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4

Firm
Names
Samper
Groft
Troper
Rone
Karlow
Bower
Varic
Milex

Frequency
Chosen a
13
18
14
17
18
13
18
12

Mean
Attractiveness b
6.64
7.14
6.93
7.39
7.39
7.32
7.86
6.86

Attractiveness
Differences
within each
Pair c
0.50
0.46
0.07
1.00

Notes:
a
Thirty-one pretest participants were asked to chose to invest in one of the two firms within each
of the four pairs. One participant failed to make a choice for the fourth pair.
b
Twenty-eight pretest participants rated the attractiveness of each paired firm as a potential
investment opportunity. Participants recorded their responses on an eleven-point scale, where 0 =
“not attractive” and 10 = “very attractive”.
c
The absolute value of the difference between pretest participants‟ mean attractiveness ratings
within each pair.
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3.3.3.2

Disclosure Type
The second independent variable, disclosure type, was manipulated at three levels

and refers to whether the legal disclosures were in compliance with: (1) current SFAS 5
(SFAS 5 condition); (2) the FASB‟s proposed amendment presented more objectively
(objective amendment condition); or (3) the FASB‟s proposed amendment presented
more opportunistically (opportunistic amendment condition). The disclosure in the SFAS
5 condition contained one reasonably possible lawsuit. Management introduced the
litigation by stating that the existing accounting standard (i.e., SFAS 5) requires
disclosure of lawsuits that management believes have at least a reasonably possible
likelihood of resulting in a material liability. The two proposed amendment conditions
each contained the same reasonably possible lawsuit as the SFAS 5 condition, as well as
three additional lawsuits that are less than reasonably possible but more than remote. In
all three disclosure type conditions, each lawsuit was individually identified as having
either a “reasonably possible” or a “slightly more than remote” likelihood of leading to a
material loss. Thus, in both the objective and opportunistic amendment conditions, the
financial statements provided the same set of lawsuits and disclosed the same likelihoods
of loss for each.
In the objective amendment condition, management relayed the facts of the
pending litigation in a fairly straightforward and direct manner, with little “spin”.
Management introduced the litigation by stating that the accounting standard requires
disclosure of lawsuits that management believes have more than a remote likelihood of
resulting in a material liability. The reasonably possible lawsuit was the first disclosed,
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followed by the three lower probability lawsuits. All lawsuits were labeled to clearly
distinguish one lawsuit from the next.
To create disclosures in compliance with the lower probability threshold that were
more opportunistically presented, I referred to actual financial statement disclosures,
emphasis framing theory, and the prior accounting literature. Based on this examination,
I identified persuasion tactics that are available to management in a litigation disclosure
setting: the placement, labeling, and framing of lawsuits within the disclosure (Bouwman
1982; Hunton and McEwen 1997; Nelson et al. 1997; Nelson and Oxley 1999; Maines
and McDaniel 2000; Druckman 2001; Lipe and Salterio 2002; McCaffery and Baron
2004; Maule and Villejoubert 2007; Slothuus 2008; Bonner 2008). Following prior
persuasion research in accounting, the presentation of the disclosures under the proposed
amendment in this study made use of all three persuasion tactics that would be available,
practicable, and likely to be used simultaneously by managers to craft disclosures which
are more opportunistic versus more objective (Rich et al. 1997; Tan and Yip-Ow 2001). I
did this to more fully distinguish the opportunistic condition from the more objective
condition (Kerlinger and Lee 2000). Specifically, in the opportunistic amendment
condition, management introduced the litigation by discussing the litigious nature of the
industry and by strategically emphasizing that the accounting standard requires disclosure
at a very low probability threshold. Within the disclosure, management did not
individually label each lawsuit and presented the reasonably possible lawsuit in the
middle of the disclosure.
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3.3.3.2.1

Opportunistic Disclosure Pretest

I used a pretest prior to gathering data in the main experiment to ensure that
participants would perceive the disclosures in the opportunistic amendment condition to
be more strategic and less objective than the disclosures in the objective amendment
condition. A pretest with 29 senior accounting undergraduates suggests that the
disclosures in the objective amendment condition were less strategic than the disclosures
in the opportunistic amendment condition (means = 4.48 versus 8.17, t = -7.97, on a scale
where 0 = “not at all strategic” and 10 = “very strategic”; p < 0.001). In addition, the
disclosures in the objective amendment condition were viewed as more objective than the
disclosures in the opportunistic amendment condition (means = 8.04 versus 3.82, t =
9.03, where 0 = “not at all objective” and 10 = “very objective”; p < 0.001). Further, all
pretest participants also selected the objective amendment condition disclosure as the
presentation that was the more objective and less opportunistic of the two.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS
4.1

Introduction
In this chapter, I provide the results of the manipulation checks, hypothesis tests

and post-experimental questions. To test my hypotheses, I analyze participants‟
responses using a 3×3 analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with investor position and
disclosure type as the independent variables and participants‟ perceptions of industry
litigiousness as a covariate. First, I test how prospective investors assimilate additional
low probability lawsuits into their litigation risk assessments (H1). Next, I test how long
and short investors assimilate additional low probability lawsuits into their litigation risk
assessments (H2a and H2b). Finally, I test how an opportunistic disclosure strategy
allowed by a lower accounting threshold influences investors‟ judgments (H3a and H3b).
4.2

Manipulation Checks

4.2.1

Investor Position
I randomly assigned participants to one of three investor position conditions: (1)

long (2) short and (3) prospective. After reading the investment position manipulation in
the case materials, I asked participants the following:
“To ensure that you understand the manner in which you will be paid for your
investment position, which of the following statements is true?” (I will be paid $15 if the
company I selected is the better performer or $5 if it is the worse performer. / I will be
paid $15 if the company I selected is the worse performer or $5 if it is the better
performer. / I will be paid a flat $10 for providing my judgments.). Participants
successfully identified their respective compensation scheme based on their investment
position 99% of the time, similar to Hales (2007) and Thayer (2011). This suggests that
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my manipulation of investor position was successful. Results of my hypothesis testing
are unchanged if the two participants who failed to correctly recall their investment
position compensation scheme are removed from the analyses.
4.2.2

Disclosure Type
I randomly assigned participants to one of three disclosure type conditions: (1)

current SFAS 5 (SFAS 5 condition); (2) the FASB‟s proposed amendment presented more
objectively (objective amendment condition); or (3) the FASB‟s proposed amendment
presented more opportunistically (opportunistic amendment condition). In the postexperimental questionnaire, I asked participants, “Approximately how many lawsuits
were disclosed in the footnotes to Karlow‟s [Bower‟s] 2009 financial statements?” (one /
four). Participants correctly recalled the number of lawsuits disclosed 89% of the time.
Next, participants responded to the following prompt: “According to the disclosures in
Karlow‟s [Bower‟s] financial statements, the prevailing accounting standard requires
Karlow [Bower] to disclose pending lawsuits when the likelihood they would lead to a
material loss is:” (at least reasonably possible / more than remote). Participants also
correctly recalled the probability threshold 89% of the time. Together, the results of
these two questions suggest that my manipulation of disclosure type was successful.
Results of my hypothesis testing are unchanged if those participants who failed to
correctly recall the number of lawsuits disclosed and/or the probability threshold are
removed from the analyses.
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4.3

Tests of Hypotheses

4.3.1

Introduction
In this section, I present my hypotheses tests. My hypotheses predict

relationships between the two independent variables (investor position and disclosure
type) and the dependent variable (investors‟ litigation risk assessments). I test my
hypotheses using a 3×3 ANCOVA model and contrast tests where applicable. Tests are
one-tailed when I have directional expectations and are two-tailed otherwise.
ANCOVA is appropriate when there is ancillary information related to the
dependent variable available for each participant (Keppel and Wickens 2004). Consistent
with this, I measure participants‟ prior beliefs about the litigiousness of the
pharmaceutical industry and find that these beliefs are correlated with their loss
likelihood judgments (r = 0.253, p = 0.002), and that individuals who believe the industry
to be more litigious tend to assess litigation risk higher across experimental conditions (F
= 10.22, p = 0.002). As such, I include this variable as a covariate when testing my
hypotheses. Results are similar if the covariate is removed from the model.
Table 4 shows an ANCOVA of participants‟ litigation risk assessments, while
Figure 3 shows their mean assessments from this model by experimental condition. The
ANCOVA includes participants‟ prior beliefs about industry litigiousness as a covariate.
The investor position × disclosure type interaction (F = 2.37, p = 0.055, two-tailed) is
displayed graphically in Figure 3.
Figure 3 also shows that the ordering of long, prospective, and short investors‟
litigation risk assessments under the current, higher SFAS 5 probability threshold is
consistent with their motivated reasoning goals. Long investors judge litigation risk
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lowest (4.92), followed by prospective investors (6.73), with short investors judging
litigation risk highest (7.18). A Jonckheere-Terpstra test confirms that this ordering of
investors‟ judgments under the SFAS 5 threshold is statistically significant (z = -2.92, p =
0.002, one-tailed).

TABLE 4
Analysis of Covariance

Source
Industry Litigiousness (covariate)
Investor Position
Disclosure Type
Investor Position × Disclosure Type
Error

Sum of
Squares
42.36
59.32
59.55
39.37
580.34

df
1
2
2
4
140

Mean
Square
F
42.36 10.22
29.66 7.16
29.78 7.18
9.84 2.37
4.15

p-value
0.002
0.001
0.001
0.055

Notes:
Dependent variable: Litigation Risk Assessments. Participants assessed the likelihood that the firm
will incur a future material loss due to the disclosed litigation. Participants recorded their
responses on an eleven-point scale, where 0 = “material loss not at all likely” and 10 = “material
loss very likely”.
Independent variables: Investor Position is manipulated as participants‟ position in the firm (long,
short, or prospective investor). Disclosure Type manipulated whether participants received
pending litigation disclosures in compliance with SFAS 5 (i.e., “at least reasonably possible”
threshold), the FASB‟s proposed amendment (i.e., “more than remote” threshold) presented more
objectively, or the FASB‟s proposed amendment presented more opportunistically. Analysis
includes a covariate, participants‟ perceptions of Industry Litigiousness, which is participants‟
responses to a post-experimental question about the litigiousness of the pharmaceutical industry
(eleven-point scale where 0 = “not at all litigious” and 10 = “very litigious”).

4.3.2

Test of H1
H1 predicts that prospective investors‟ assessments of the risk from disclosed

litigation will decrease under the proposed standard even though more lawsuits are
disclosed. H1 is formally stated as follows:
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FIGURE 3
Litigation Risk Assessments
8.0
Short
7.18

7.43

7.0

Prospective
Long

6.73
6.0
5.54

5.0

4.92

4.95

SFAS 5

Objective Amendement

4.93
4.76
4.75

4.0
Opportunistic Amendment

Notes:
Dependent variable (vertical axis): Litigation Risk Assessments. Participants assessed the
likelihood that the firm will incur a future material loss due to the disclosed litigation. Participants
recorded their responses on an eleven-point scale, where 0 = “material loss not at all likely” and
10 = “material loss very likely”. Means reported above are derived from the ANCOVA presented
in Table 4.
Independent variables: Investor Position is manipulated as participants‟ position in the firm (long,
short, or prospective investor). Disclosure Type manipulated whether participants received
pending litigation disclosures in compliance with SFAS 5 (i.e., “at least reasonably possible”
threshold), the FASB‟s proposed amendment (i.e., “more than remote” threshold) presented more
objectively, or the FASB‟s proposed amendment presented more opportunistically.
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H1: Prospective investors will judge the risk from disclosed litigation lower
under the lower “more than remote” threshold than under the higher “at least
reasonably possible” threshold, even though additional lawsuits are disclosed.
As Figure 3 shows, prospective investors‟ litigation risk assessments decreased
from 6.73 in the current SFAS 5 condition to 5.54 in the objective amendment condition
(t= 1.77, p = 0.040, one-tailed). This result supports H1. It appears that the influence of
the reasonably possible lawsuit on prospective investors‟ litigation risk assessments is
diluted by the low probability lawsuits under the lower threshold. Thus, prospective
investors assess litigation risk lower under a lower threshold, even though more lawsuits
are disclosed.
4.3.3

Tests of H2a and H2b
Hypothesis 2a predicts that long investors‟ litigation risk judgments in the

objective amendment condition will be less than or equal to those in the current SFAS 5
condition. Hypothesis 2b similarly predicts that short investors‟ judgments in the
objective amendment condition will be greater than or equal to those in the current SFAS
5 condition. H2a and H2b are formally stated as follows:
H2a: Long investors‟ judgments of litigation risk under the lower “more than
remote” threshold will be less than or equal to their judgments under the higher
“at least reasonably possible” threshold.
H2b: Short investors‟ judgments of litigation risk under the lower “more than
remote” threshold will be greater than or equal to their judgments under the
higher “at least reasonably possible” threshold.
As Figure 3 shows, long and short investors‟ judgments did not change
significantly between the current SFAS 5 condition and the objective amendment
condition (4.92 vs. 4.95, t = 0.03, p = 0.485 and 7.18 vs. 7.43, t = 0.32, p = 0.374,
respectively, both one-tailed). These results are consistent with H2a and H2b, and
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suggest that long and short investors‟ judgments were at or close to the bounds of their
reasonableness constraints in both the current SFAS 5 and objective amendment
conditions. This is also consistent with my relatively strong manipulation of directional
goals, as noted in Chapter 3.
4.3.4

Tests of H3a and H3b
Following the PKM, H3a predicts that the differences across long, prospective,

and short investors‟ loss likelihood judgments will be larger in the opportunistic
amendment than in the objective amendment condition. In contrast, and consistent with
emphasis framing theory, H3b makes the competing prediction that those differences will
be smaller in the opportunistic amendment condition. H3a and H3b are formally stated
as follows:
H3a: The differences across long, prospective, and short investors‟ litigation risk
judgments when litigation disclosures are presented opportunistically under the
lower threshold will be greater than or equal to the differences when litigation
disclosures are presented more objectively under the lower threshold.
H3b: The differences across long, prospective, and short investors‟ litigation risk
judgments will be smaller when litigation disclosures are presented
opportunistically under the lower threshold than when they are presented more
objectively under the lower threshold.
As Figure 3 shows, short and prospective investors‟ judgments appear to converge
toward long investors‟ judgments in the opportunistic amendment condition, consistent
with H3b and inconsistent with H3a. First, to test whether the differences across long,
prospective, and short investors change at all, I conducted a 3×2 ANCOVA across the
three investment positions (long, prospective, and short) and the two relevant amendment
conditions (objective and opportunistic), and find a statistically significant interaction (F
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= 3.28, p = 0.042; non-tabulated).7 Next, a Jonckheere-Terpstra test shows that the
ordering of long, prospective, and short investors‟ litigation risk judgments is significant
within the objective amendment condition (i.e., across 4.95, 5.54, and 7.43, respectively;
z = −3.40, p < 0.001, one-tailed), but insignificant within the opportunistic amendment
condition (i.e., across 4.75, 4.93, and 4.76, respectively; z = 0.02, p = 0.984). Similarly,
the difference between long and short investors‟ judgments is significant within the
objective amendment condition (4.95 vs. 7.43, t = 3.17, p = 0.001, one-tailed), but
insignificant within the opportunistic amendment condition (4.75 vs. 4.76, t = 0.00, p =
0.988). That is, the difference between long and short investors‟ judgments is
significantly smaller in the opportunistic amendment condition than in the objective
amendment condition (t = 2.85, p = 0.003, one-tailed). These results support H3b, but not
H3a.
Additional analysis suggests that the disclosure in the opportunistic amendment
condition led short investors to view pending litigation as favorably for the firm as even
long investors, despite their directional preferences. As Figure 3 shows, long investors‟
judgments remain flat across all three disclosure conditions (4.92, 4.95, and 4.75),
suggesting that (as in my tests of H2a), long investors were evaluating the disclosed
litigation at the boundaries of their reasonableness constraints. Specifically, long
investors‟ judgments do not change between the objective amendment and opportunistic
amendment condition (t = 0.28, p = 0.779). In contrast, short investors‟ loss likelihood
judgments decrease significantly from the objective amendment condition to the
opportunistic amendment condition (7.43 vs. 4.76, t = 3.47, p = 0.001). Moreover, within

7

Keppel and Wickens (2004) suggest using such analyses when comparing three or more groups within a
larger experiment.
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the opportunistic amendment condition, both short and prospective investors‟ judgments
appear to be as favorable to the firm as long investors‟ judgments (4.76 vs. 4.75, t = 0.00,
p = 0.988 and 4.93 vs. 4.75, t = 0.25, p = 0.802, respectively). Thus, my findings
demonstrate that firms can use the opportunistic disclosures allowed by a lower threshold
to their advantage, potentially persuading prospective investors and even short investors
to view the disclosure as favorably for the firm as do long investors.
4.4

Post-Experimental and Demographic Questions
After making their litigation risk assessments, I asked participants to answer a

number of post-experimental questions and demographic questions. In one set of postexperimental questions, I asked participants to provide their opinions about the firm‟s
legal disclosures. Participants responded to the following four items on 11-point likert
scales:
1. “How objective are Karlow‟s [Bower‟s] legal disclosures?”
(Not At All Objective / Very Objective)
2. “How credible are Karlow‟s [Bower‟s] legal disclosures?”
(Not At All Credible / Very Credible)
3. “How forthcoming are Karlow‟s [Bower‟s] legal disclosures?”
(Not At All Forthcoming / Very Forthcoming)
4. “How reliable are Karlow‟s [Bower‟s] legal disclosures?”
(Not At All Reliable / Very Reliable)
I included these variables as covariates in the analyses I used to test my
hypotheses. The results of my hypotheses tests are not significantly affected when I
control for these variables.
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In addition, I asked participants to provide their opinions about the litigiousness
of the pharmaceutical industry, the outlook for the pharmaceutical industry, and the
outlook for the stock market. Participants responded to the following three items on 11point likert scales:
1. “How litigious is the pharmaceutical industry, in your opinion?”
(Not At All Litigious / Very Litigious)
2. “What do you believe is the current outlook for the pharmaceutical industry?”
(Very Negative Outlook / Very Positive Outlook)
3. “What do you believe is the current outlook for the stock market in general?”
(Very Negative Outlook / Very Positive Outlook)
I included these variables as covariates in the analyses I used to test my
hypotheses. I found that individuals who believe the industry to be more litigious tend to
assess litigation risk higher across experimental conditions (F = 10.22, p = 0.002).
Conversely, I found that participants did not assess industry outlook (F = 1.54, p = 0.217)
or stock market outlook (F = 0.51, p = 0. 477) differently across experimental conditions.
Furthermore, participants‟ assessments of the litigiousness of the industry still remained
significant after controlling for industry outlook and stock market outlook both separately
and jointly. As such, I included participants‟ perceptions of the litigiousness of the
pharmaceutical industry as a covariate when testing my hypotheses, as noted earlier in
this chapter.
I also asked participants to provide some demographic information in the postexperimental questionnaire. For example, I asked participants to provide information
about their educational background as follows:
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1. “In which program are you enrolled?”
o
o
o
o
o
o

MBA
PMBA
MSA
MSF
Undergraduate Program
Other _______________

2. “Please indicate the name of the university where you are enrolled in the
program above:” ____________________________________________
3. “How many accounting and finance courses have you taken, including the
courses in which you are currently enrolled?”
(sliding scale with endpoints 0, 20 courses)
4. “Have you previously taken, or are you currently taking, a Financial
Statement Analysis course?”
(Yes / No)
In general, I found that the results of my hypotheses tests are not significantly
affected by including these demographic variables as covariates in my analyses.
Participants‟ program type (F = 0.73, p = 0.393) and university (F = 0.16, p = 0.687) were
not significant explanatory variables. The number of accounting (F = 0.02, p = 0.889)
and finance (F = 0.006, p = 0.940) courses participants had taken and whether they had
completed a financial statement analysis course (F = 1.55, p = 0.215) also were not
significant explanatory variables.
Next, I asked participants to indicate whether they had work experience as a
financial analyst and whether they ever invested in the stock market or planned to do so
in the future. I gathered this demographic information to support the notion that my
participants were, generally, nonprofessionals with investing experience / interest (i.e.,
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appropriate participants for my investment task). Results support this assertion. I found
that 95% had previously invested or planned to invest in the stock market. I also included
these variables as covariates and found that previous investing experience (F = 0.006, p =
0.939) and future investing plans (F = 0.21, p = 0.650) were not significant explanatory
variables. Further, excluding the 5% of participants who had neither previously invested
nor planned to invest in the future did not affect the results of my hypotheses tests. Only
8% of participants had worked as a financial analyst, but this was not a significant
explanatory variable (F = 0.22, p = 0.641). Results remain similar when these
participants are excluded from my hypotheses tests. I also asked participants about their
work history and advanced education as follows:
1. Have you, or has anyone in your immediate family, ever worked in the
pharmaceutical industry?
(Self / Family Member / No)
2. Have you, or has anyone in your immediate family, worked in the legal field
(e.g., lawyer, paralegal, etc.)?
(Self / Family Member / No)
3. Do you hold any advanced degrees (e.g., M.D., D.O., J.D., Ph.D., etc.)?
(Yes (if yes, please specify which degree) / No)
The results of my hypotheses tests are not significantly affected by including
these demographic variables as covariates in my analyses. Having work experience in
the pharmaceutical industry (F = 0.25, p = 0.618) or in the legal field (F = 0.619, p =
0.433) were not significant explanatory variables. Having an advanced degree was also
not a significant covariate (F = 0.02, p = 0.899).
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I also gathered demographic information about participants‟ years of business
experience and gender. I found that my results were not sensitive to years of professional
business experience (F = 0.02, p = 0.896) or gender (F = 0.003, p = 0.957).
4.5

Summary of Results
The results of this study suggest there may be unintended consequences of

lowering a disclosure threshold, such as the one recently proposed by the FASB (2008).
First, I find that adding low probability lawsuits to the disclosure of reasonably possible
lawsuits lowers prospective investors‟ litigation risk assessments, even though more
lawsuits are disclosed. Second, lowering the threshold allows firms to portray the entire
disclosure opportunistically, diverting attention from higher probability to lower
probability lawsuits. I find evidence that firms can use such an opportunistic presentation
under a lower threshold to their advantage. Specifically, prospective investors‟ and even
short investors‟ litigation risk assessments were as favorable for the firm as long
investors‟ when the disclosure threshold was lower and firms adopted an opportunistic
disclosure strategy. Thus, my findings suggest that the FASB‟s proposal to require
disclosure of lower probability loss contingencies may have unintended consequences for
investors‟ perceptions of firms‟ loss exposure.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
5.1

Introduction
This study investigates two unintended consequences of lowering a disclosure

threshold, motivated by recent FASB proposals. In my experiment, nonprofessional
investors were provided financial statements and legal disclosures for a hypothetical
pharmaceutical company and were asked to assess the likelihood of material loss due to
disclosed pending litigation. Participants were randomly assigned to a long, prospective,
or short investment position, and to one of three disclosure conditions. Participants
received disclosures: (1) with a probability threshold of “at least reasonably possible”
(i.e., consistent with existing SFAS 5); (2) with a probability threshold of “more than
remote” (i.e., consistent with the FASB‟s proposed amendment); or (3) with a probability
threshold of “more than remote” (i.e., consistent with the FASB‟s proposed amendment)
and an opportunistic reporting strategy allowed by the lower threshold. The same
reasonably possible lawsuit was presented in all three disclosure conditions, since both
SFAS 5 and the proposed amendment would require disclosure of lawsuits at this
probability threshold. However, in the two lower probability threshold conditions, three
additional lawsuits with a slightly more than remote likelihood of leading to a material
loss were also disclosed in either a more objective manner or in a more opportunistic
manner designed to persuade investors to perceive the litigation, as a whole, as less
serious. The sections that follow provide conclusions, implications, and directions for
future research.
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5.2

Discussion
Recently, investors have criticized the quality of firms‟ loss contingency

disclosures, by asserting that disclosures under SFAS 5 do not adequately allow them to
predict and assess the likelihood, amount, and timing of future cash flows (FASB 2008).
In response to investors‟ assertions, the FASB issued an Exposure Draft that, among
other changes, proposes lowering the probability threshold for disclosure of loss
contingencies from “at least reasonably possible” to “more than remote” (FASB 2008,
paragraph 5). According to the FASB (2008), this lower threshold would require many
firms to disclose more pending lawsuits (FASB 2008). My study reports the results of an
experiment which investigates two unintended consequences of lowering the disclosure
threshold.
My results show that under the current SFAS 5 disclosure threshold, investors‟
judgments are consistent with their motivated reasoning goals. That is, consistent with
their preferences for higher profitability and share price, long investors assess the firm‟s
likelihood of loss due to disclosed litigation lowest, while short investors (who require
lower share prices in order to profit) assess the firm‟s likelihood of loss highest.
Prospective investors, who have no position in the firm and therefore an incentive to
objectively assess potential losses, fall in between short and long investors. When the
probability threshold is lowered to include low probability lawsuits, prospective investors
decrease their loss likelihood judgments, even though more litigation is disclosed. This
finding suggests that the low probability lawsuits dilute the influence of the higher
probability lawsuit on prospective investors‟ litigation risk assessments. Conversely,
long and short investors continue to be influenced by their directional preferences and
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assimilate the additional low probability lawsuits in a manner that biases them toward
their preferred conclusions. My results also suggest that the form of management‟s
presentation also influences investors‟ perceptions of litigation losses. When managers
use an opportunistic presentation under the lower probability threshold, they can
successfully persuade all investors to perceive pending litigation more favorably for the
firm, despite investors‟ directional preferences.
5.3

Implications
My findings have a number of important implications. For example, my results

should be of interest to the FASB as they continue to contemplate lowering disclosure
thresholds in the ongoing SFAS 5 debate. My findings suggest that the FASB should
exercise caution if disclosure thresholds are lowered, as they may not result in better
investor judgments. The FASB‟s Exposure Draft as currently written leaves openings for
managers to frame lawsuits in an opportunistic manner, and my results suggest that
investors are persuaded by such a presentation. My results suggest that policy makers
should consider both whether and how disclosures are presented.
While the SFAS 5 debate provides a timely backdrop for studying the
consequences of expanding disclosure requirements, my findings may inform other
settings in which similar disclosure expansions are being contemplated. For example, in
2010, the SEC implemented new requirements that publicly traded companies disclose
any risks that climate change might pose to their future operations or profits (SEC 2010).
Firms could choose to disclose all risks objectively (i.e., present both more and less
remote risks in a transparent manner). Alternatively, as this new mandate would require
many firms to disclose more items, firms could use the new mandate to disclose
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information opportunistically (e.g., strategically disclosing a number of very remote risks
to draw attention away from potentially more serious ones). Thus, similar unintended
consequences could potentially occur in a variety of settings in which disclosure
requirements are expanded.
5.4

Directions for Future Research
While my results may help inform standard setters and regulators about potential

unintended consequences of an expansion of disclosure requirements, future research
could explore factors that may moderate my findings. For example, there may be factors
that would cause a firm‟s opportunistic disclosure to have no effect on short sellers or
even backfire (e.g., disclosures that go overboard, cf., Friestad and Wright 1994). Taskrelevant factors that amplify, impose boundary conditions, or even reverse the effects
shown here are interesting possible directions for future research.
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APPENDIX
RESEARCH INSTRUMENT
This instrument was administered on a computer. The screens viewed by participants are
provided on the following pages.


EXHIBIT 1. Instructions (Provided to Participants in All Conditions)



EXHIBIT 2a. Manipulation of Investment Position (Provided to Participants in
the Long Investor Condition)



EXHIBIT 2b. Manipulation of Investment Position (Provided to Participants in
the Prospective Investor Condition)



EXHIBIT 2c. Manipulation of Investment Position (Provided to Participants in
the Short Investor Condition)



EXHIBIT 3a. Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check
Screen (Provided to Participants in the Long Investor/SFAS 5 Condition)



EXHIBIT 3b. Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check
Screen (Provided to Participants in the Long Investor/Objective Amendment
Condition and the Long Investor/Opportunistic Amendment Condition)



EXHIBIT 3c. Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check
Screen (Provided to Participants in the Prospective Investor/ SFAS 5 Condition)



EXHIBIT 3d. Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check
Screen (Provided to Participants in the Prospective Investor/Objective
Amendment Condition and the Prospective Investor/Opportunistic Amendment
Condition)
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EXHIBIT 3e. Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check
Screen (Provided to Participants in the Short Investor/SFAS 5 Condition)



EXHIBIT 3f. Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check
Screen (Provided to Participants in the Short Investor/Objective Amendment
Condition and the Short Investor/Opportunistic Amendment Condition)



EXHIBIT 4. Financial Statements Screen (Provided to Participants in All
Conditions)



EXHIBIT 5a. Legal Proceedings and Contingencies and Dependent Variables
Screen (Provided to Participants in the SFAS 5 Condition)



EXHIBIT 5b. Legal Proceedings and Contingencies and Dependent Variables
Screen (Provided to Participants in the Objective Amendment Condition)



EXHIBIT 5c. Legal Proceedings and Contingencies and Dependent Variables
Screen (Provided to Participants in the Opportunistic Amendment Condition)



EXHIBIT 6. Post-Experimental Questionnaire (Provided to Participants in All
Conditions)



EXHIBIT 7a. Compensation Data Screen (Provided to Participants in the Long
Investor Condition)



EXHIBIT 7b. Compensation Data Screen (Provided to Participants in the
Prospective Investor Condition)



EXHIBIT 7c. Compensation Data Screen (Provided to Participants in the Short
Investor Condition)



EXHIBIT 8. Demographic Questions (Provided to Participants in All Conditions)
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EXHIBIT 1
Instructions (Provided to Participants in All Conditions)
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EXHIBIT 2a
Manipulation of Investment Position (Provided to Participants in the Long Investor
Condition)
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EXHIBIT 2b
Manipulation of Investment Position (Provided to Participants in the Prospective Investor
Condition)
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EXHIBIT 2c
Manipulation of Investment Position (Provided to Participants in the Short Investor
Condition)
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EXHIBIT 3a
Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check Screen (Provided to
Participants in the Long Investor/SFAS 5 Condition)

[Note: If the participant chose to invest in Bower, all instances of “Karlow” would read
“Bower”.]
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EXHIBIT 3b
Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check Screen (Provided to
Participants in the Long Investor/Objective Amendment Condition and the Long
Investor/Opportunistic Amendment Condition)
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EXHIBIT 3c
Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check Screen (Provided to
Participants in the Prospective Investor/SFAS 5 Condition)
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EXHIBIT 3d
Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check Screen (Provided to
Participants in the Prospective Investor/Objective Amendment Condition and the
Prospective Investor/Opportunistic Amendment Condition)
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EXHIBIT 3e
Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check Screen
(Provided to Participants in the Short Investor/SFAS 5 Condition)
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EXHIBIT 3f
Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check Screen
(Provided to Participants in the Short Investor/Objective Amendment Condition and the
Short Investor/Opportunistic Amendment Condition)
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EXHIBIT 4
Financial Statements Screen (Provided to Participants in All Conditions)
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EXHIBIT 5a
Legal Proceedings and Contingencies and Dependent Variables Screen (Provided to
Participants in the SFAS 5 Condition)
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EXHIBIT 5b
Legal Proceedings and Contingencies and Dependent Variables Screen (Provided to
Participants in the Objective Amendment Condition)
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EXHIBIT 5c
Legal Proceedings and Contingencies and Dependent Variables Screen (Provided to
Participants in the Opportunistic Amendment Condition)
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EXHIBIT 6
Post-Experimental Questionnaire (Provided to Participants in All Conditions)
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EXHIBIT 7a
Compensation Data Screen (Provided to Participants in the Long Investor Condition)
[Note: Each participant receives one of the following screens depending on their firm
choice and the resulting payout appropriate for that choice.]
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EXHIBIT 7b
Compensation Data Screen (Provided to Participants in the Prospective Investor
Condition)
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EXHIBIT 7c
Compensation Data Screen (Provided to Participants in the Short Investor Condition)
[Note: Each participant receives one of the following screens depending on their firm
choice and the resulting payout appropriate for that choice.]
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EXHIBIT 8
Demographic Questions (Provided to Participants in All Conditions)
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